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Abstract
Data has overwhelmed the digital world in terms of volume, variety and velocity. Dataintensive applications are facing unprecedented challenges. On the other hand, computation
resources, such as memory, suffer from shortage comparing to data scale. However, in
certain applications, it is a must to process large amount of data in a time efficient manner.
Probabilistic approaches are compromises between these three perspectives: large amount
of data, limited computation resources and high time efficiency, in the sense that those
approaches cannot guarantee 100% correctness, their error rates, however, are predictable
and adjustable depending on available computation resources and time constraints.
Data storage and data integrity check are two fundamental components in data-intensive
applications. Among various data storage platforms, key-value storage is crucial for many
applications, such as social networks, online retailing, and cloud computing. Such storage
provides support for operations on key-value pairs, and can locate in memory to speed up
responses to queries. So far, existing methods have been deterministic. Providing such
accuracy, however, comes at the cost of memory and CPU time. In contrast, we present an
approximate key-value storage that is more compact and efficient than existing methods.
Besides data storage, ensuring data integrity during its life-cycle is also paramount
important, particularly in large scale high-performance computing (HPC) applications. Since
scientific data can take millions of compute hours to generate, the results often need to be
sanitized, validated, and archived for long term storage, and shared with scientific community
for further analysis. Ensuring the data integrity of the full dataset at scale is a daunting
task, considering that most conventional tools are serial and file-based, and cannot scale.
To tackle this particular challenge, we presents the design, implementation and evaluation

v

of two Bloom filter based scalable parallel checksumming tools, for data integrity check and
data corruption detection purposes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Data has overwhelmed the digital world in terms of volume, variety and velocity, and dataintensive applications are facing unprecedented challenges [16]. Today, human can generate
5 exabytes of data in two days, which is the amount of all the data created until 2003 [55]. At
the same time, computation resources, such as CPU computing power and memory capacity,
suffer from shortage comparing to data scale, or their cost is too high to keep up the pace with
sharp increase of data volume. However, in certain scenarios, it is a must to process large
amount of data in a time efficient manner. Probabilistic approaches [30, 43] are compromises
between these three perspectives: large amount of data, limited computation resources and
high time efficiency, in the sense that those approaches cannot guarantee 100% correctness,
their error rates, however, are adjustable depending on available computation resources and
time constraints. If lower error rate is preferable, more computation resources and low time
efficiency are expected. Conversely, we sacrifice error rate for less computation resources and
high time efficiency.
With estimated error rates derived through mathematical analysis, probabilistic approaches are beneficial in certain applications in which error rates are tolerable.

For

example, building data models [43] and make predictions [4] in data mining [62] and artificial
intelligence. On the other hand, due to much higher time efficiency than deterministic
approaches, probabilistic approaches can be applied as a pre-process step to speed up
following data processing [29].

1

1.1

Probabilistic key-value store

Data storage is a fundamental component in data-intensive applications. Among various
data storage platforms, key-value (k-v) storage is crucial for many different network
applications, such as social networks, online retailers, and cloud computing [65, 7]. Example
implementations include Dynamo [20], Cassandra [5], Memcached [45], Redis [54], and
BigTable [15]. By storing most data in the main memory, these implementations allow
insert, query, update, and delete operations of key-value pairs. The particular keys and
values can be highly flexible: an online retailer can use the keys to represent the product
catalog IDs, and the values to represent their associated metadata, such as its category or
the latest updated price. Because of its importance, k-v storage has been heavily fine-tuned
for the best performance in terms of cache usage, load balancing, and response time.
One observation of these different key-value storage services is that they are deterministic.
For example, if a key-value pair was previously inserted, a query on the key should always
return its value. Although this is desired, doing so requires storing and processing complete
information of the keys and values, which introduces overhead. Therefore, we develop a
highly compact, low-overhead, but approximate k-v storage service, by taking inspiration
from the Bloom filter [12] (see Section 1.4 for description).
However, despite of their usefulness, Bloom filters are designed for testing set memberships, not key-value operations. Therefore, our goal is to develop an enhanced version of
the Bloom filter, so that it is able to support key-value operations. Specifically, it should
support these following APIs: insert, update, delete, and query. We call our design
the key-value Bloom filter (kBF). Our goal is to make kBF highly compact, by making the
tradeoff that we allow false positives to occur, just like the Bloom filter. This means that
querying a non-existent key may return a value that does not actually belong to it. Although
this may sound counter-intuitive at first, we argue that there exists applications that such
approximate results are still acceptable: for example, an online shopping service may store
product ID and its category as key-values to answer users’ queries. If the kBF is used,
occasionally querying a product ID that does not exist may return a category that is still
valid. This, however, will not be a problem because such false products are fictional in the
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first place, and adding additional information to it, such as category, does not make them
valid. By using the kBF, on the other hand, allows us to speed up such query processing
considerably and to narrow down the list of products quickly.
Developing this data structure, however, is particularly challenging for two reasons. First,
the original Bloom filter uses bit arrays to keep track of the membership of elements. The keys
and values, however, are much more irregular in length, and can not be directly stored into
typical Bloom filters. Second, the original Bloom filter does not support deletions. Although
later research, such as the counting Bloom filter [25], partially addressed this problem by
using counters to replace bits of a typical Bloom filter, it only keeps the frequency of elements
instead of the values of elements themselves.
The approach we present aims to address these problems by supporting k-v operations
with predictable performance and accuracy. In particular, it has the following three key
contributions:
• To address the challenge of arbitrary key-value pairs, we propose a method to encode
the values into a special type of binary encodings that can fit into the cells of Bloom
filters easily. These encodings are designed to be resilient to collisions, i.e., insertions
and queries can still be effectively handled when one or more collisions occur in a
cell. In particular, the decoding allows using k hashed locations collaboratively, rather
than using any single one of them, so that the successful decoding ratio can be greatly
improved.
• To address the challenge to handle a very large number k-v pairs, we design the kBF to
be elastic, so that its capacity can grow and shrink as needed while ensuring that the
desired query performance is achieved. To this end, we develop growth and compaction
operations on the kBF to support its capacity changes.
• To address the challenge to achieve predictable performance, we systematically analyze
the capacity and decoding ratio of the kBF to demonstrate its performance limits. We
derive closed form results to this end, so that we can closely monitor the runtime
performance of the kBF to ensure a satisfactory quality of service.

3

• We develop a distributed design of the kBF, the d-kBF, so that a user may use the
familiar client-server model to invoke the kBF service remotely. This contribution
makes the kBF to be scalable to massive datasets.
• To further illustrate its effectiveness, we demonstrate through a specific application
example: we use it as a building block to enforce TCP state transition rules by
developing an approximate concurrent state machine (ACSM). Using ACSMs, a router
can efficiently keep track of many regular expression matchings simultaneously to detect
potential intrusions.
We describe the design of the kBF in chapter 2.

1.2

A variant of key-value store: path reconstruction
problem

On the other hand, certain problems can be transformed to key-value storage problems
yet have different requisites. We investigate the path tracing problem in software defined
networks (SDNs), which aims to gain visibility of network layer behavior by reconstructing
paths traveled by packets.
Our work is motivated by two recent trends. First, the growing complexity of data center
networks (DCNs) makes it more urgent to provide efficient tools for administrators to debug
network behavior and to gain visibility on the internal operations. For example, Gill et al. [31]
points out network links has up to eight times more failures than devices in large-scale DCNs.
Later work aims to provide more reliability to users via multiple ways, such as better policy
enforcements [53], test packet generations [68], and verified network controllers [32]. Our
work is similarly motivated by these challenges, but our primary aim is to provide better
visibility on how packets flow through the DCNs, enabling greater knowledge on the likely
spots of failures and anormalies.
Second, our work’s methodology is enabled by the emergence of software-defined networks
(SDNs), a recent technology that achieved the separation of packet forwarding, or the data
plane, and the control mechanisms, or the control plane. As pointed out by a historical
4

perspective review of SDN [27], such a design choice has enabled highly flexible and
centralized network configuration and management that were previously not feasible. In
their management, network operators can utilize high-level abstractions and standard APIs,
which are translated to low-level functionalities that are installed in individual routers and
switches [42, 69, 63]. SDNs also promise virtualization directly for the network layer itself,
allowing multiple, even competing network protocols to operate concurrently while sharing
the network resources [42, 37].
In particular, by interpreting a path as a set of key-value pairs, the path reconstruction
problem is then transformed to a two-step key-value store: when packets are transmitted in
the network work, the path information, i.e., the key-value pairs, are “insert” to a key-value
store, which is encapsulated into packet header, while at the destination host, the key-value
pairs are “queried” from the key-value store, hence the path is reconstructed.
Compared with a regular key-value store problem, path construction is quite different
hence challenging in two aspects: first, since the key-value store is encapsulated into packet
header, which is limited in size, we have very small space to store path information, not
mentioning the path length can grow linearly in extreme cases. Second, path reconstruction
requires to recover not only values but also keys, while in regular key-value store, keys are
given and queried for their corresponding values. Therefore, we utilize two Bloom filters to
store path information. In such a way, the size of the key-value store is highly compact and
can fit into packet headers, and more importantly, it remains consistent when path length
grows.
We present the design of Bloom filter based path reconstruction approach (BFPR). In
contrast to the conventional approaches, our major contributions are listed as follows:
• We demonstrate that it is possible to develop a programmable Bloom filter field in
modern SDNs, and present a case for using this field for low-overhead, real time perpacket path profiling, a goal that was not feasible with conventional approaches.
• Second, our approach transforms the path profiling problem into a variant of the keyvalue store problem, which allows us to utilize the highly compact data storage provided
by Bloom filters.
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• Third, we develop a probabilistic way to decode paths through multiple, independent
packets traveling the same path, so that the resulting packet header is not sensitive to
the path length;
• Fourth, we theoretically analyze and empirically evaluate the performance of our
approach in both prototype implementations based on an OpenFlow-enabled testbed
(CloudLab) [18] and realistic simulations based on a real data center network topology
published by Facebook [24] to demonstrate the feasibility and performance superiority
of the proposed work.
Our results show that our approach requires much fewer packets to reconstruct paths,
and has no dependence on network topology or forwarding behaviors, which makes it a more
generalized solution. We present the BFPR in chaper 3.

1.3

Data integrity check and corruption detection

In high performance computing (HPC) environment, thousands of disk drives along with a
high performance distributed file system on top are home to petabytes, even exabytes of
scientific data. As an example, at Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF), the
file and storage system designed to serve 2008 Jaguar machine (known as Spider 1) provided
10 petabytes usable space. Four years later, Spider 2 (for primarily Titan supercomputer)
started provisioning 32 petabytes to the users [52]. There are 50 million directories and half
a billion files in the system, this is barely under control with active purging policy in place.
We are also observing that a single project can produce as much as 200 million files in the
short span of time. As such, the storage, management and analysis of such amount of data
present familiar yet difficult extreme-scale data challenges.
Another aspect of the scientific data is its value: it can take millions of million compute
hours to yield the dataset. The results often need to be sanitized, validated, and archived for
long term storage, and/or shared with scientific community for further analysis. Ensuring
its integrity during the usefulness of data life-cycle is paramount important. This life-cycle
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may include activities such as copying data from one file system to other, moving from one
site/facility to another.
However, due to both hardware and software induced errors, either unintended operations
or malicious intrusions, data corruption on distributed file system is the norm rather than
exception [28]. From hardware perspective, unexpected factors such as alpha particles from
package decay or cosmic rays [22], spikes in power, erratic arm movements, and scratches on
storage medium can cause data corruption [71]. For example, a 41-month study [8] based on
1.5 million disk drives reveals the fact that more than 8.5% nearline disks and about 1.9%
enterprise class disks suffered from data corruption, and there are around 400,000 checksum
mismatches. On the other hand, buggy software also leads to data corruption, ranging from
low level device drivers, system kernels and file systems [70]. Another large-scale study of disk
drives showed that faulty codes in storage systems protocol stack accounted for 5 − 10% of
all failures [38]. As a consequence, data corruption can lead to incorrect processing scientific
results. More severely, data corruption gets propagated among disk drives, causing more
data corrupted, even data lost and system failures.
One of primary approaches that counters file corruption and provide data integrity is
through checksumming [58]. By comparing previous and current checksums, one can detect
whether the content has changed. Despite its usefulness, however, checksumming is not the
predominant method, especially in distributed file systems, due to following two reasons:
First, computing checksums is painfully slow on distributed file system where there are
billions of small files, along with relatively less but very large files. Profiling of the current
production file system at OLCF, Spider 2, shows the bi-modal trend: there are over 60% of
small files that are less than 1 MiB in size, but there are also tens of thousands of files that
are over 4 TiB, hundreds of them are even as large as 32 TiB each. In both scenarios, existing
serial and file based checksumming method are extraordinarily inefficient. In the best cases,
they take an excruciatingly long time to process, or in the worst, they fail outright due to
large size of the data. In both scenarios existing serial and file based checksum method are
not efficient to handle either millions of files or files as large as many terabytes. In best
cases, they take an excruciatingly long time to process, or fail outright due to the size of the
data. Hence, a parallel checksumming approach is truly needed and preferred.
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Second, as the number of files reaches billions, storing, moving and parsing such amount of
checksums is cumbersome. Suppose there are 1 billion checksums, each of which is a 160-bit
SHA1 signature. Therefore, we need 20GB space to store just the checksums, not mentioning
other information such as file names and other metadata information. Additionally, at such a
size, transferring them around will lead to prodigious communication overhead. Furthermore,
in-memory parsing such a checksum file will be not possible unless giving adequate memory
space.
In this paper, to tackle these problems, we have made following contributions:
• We present a novel, parallel dataset checksumming approach, fsum, in Chapter 4.
More specifically, we first break files into chunks of reasonable size, and calculate
chunk-level checksums in parallel. Next, for the data integrity check purpose, we
develop a Bloom filter based method to aggregate all chunk-level checksums to yield
the single dataset-level checksum. Due to Bloom filters’ probabilistic nature of error,
we provided a detailed analysis on the trade-offs, and we demonstrated its scalability
with representative datasets from our current production environment.
• We propose a compact data structure to store checksums, called cBF (checksumming
Bloom filter), which is an extension based on classic Bloom filter and the kBF (keyvalue Bloom filter) [67]. in Chapter 5. Through cBF, if there is a dataset-level signature
mismatch according the result of fsum, we can determine which files are corrupted and
detect if there are lost files. Therefore, we can recover data through redundant copies
or RAID parity mechanism. In addition, we analyze its probability of identifying data
corruption. To this end, we present how to set parameters of cBF to achieve certain
probability of identification success.

1.4

Bloom filters

The Bloom filter, originally developed by Burton H. Bloom [12]. A Bloom filter is an array
of m bits that are initialized to all 0s, and its functionality is to identify membership, i.e.,
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Algorithm 1 Bloom Filter Insert Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:

procedure Insert(BF, e)
for i = 1 → k do
idx = hi (e)
BF [idx] = 1
end for
end procedure

Algorithm 2 Bloom Filter Query Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

procedure Query(BF, e)
for i = 1 → k do
idx = hi (e)
if BF [idx] == 0 then
Return F alse
end if
end for
return T rue
end procedure

whether an element is in a set. The Bloom filter supports two basic operations: insertion
and query, which are shown in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
By inserting an element, k hashed positions, which are calculated based on the element,
out of m bits are set to 1. By querying an element, k hashed positions are tested against 1,
and any 0 findings indicate that the element is not in the set. There are two types of errors:
false negative errors never happen to Bloom filter, i.e., an element that is actually in the set
is always returned as it is. However, false positive errors could happen with a probability,
meaning that an element is not in the set might be reported as it is, since the k bits in the
Bloom filter might be set to 1 by other elements due to hash collisions. The false positive
error probability p relates to the size (length) of the Bloom filter m, the number of elements
inserted n, and the number of hash functions k, according to
m

2

p = e− n (ln 2) .

(1.1)

In other words, to reach a certain false positive error probability, we should set the Bloom
filter size to
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m = −n

ln p
.
(ln 2)2

(1.2)

Therefore, given n, we always can increase m, i.e, utilize more space, to decrease false
positive error probability p. At the same time, given p, the Bloom filter size m is linearly
related to the number of elements n that are intended to be inserted.
Despite the errors, the Bloom filter is highly compact in terms of space: it needs 10
bits to store each element to achieve a false positive rate of 1%, independent of the number
and size of the inserted elements. This feature makes Bloom filter remain to a reasonable
size when handling large amount of data. Furthermore, since in both insertion and query
operations, we only need to calculate k hash functions, these operations take constant time
(O(1)), hence Bloom filter is much more efficient than most approaches that take O(n), even
O(log n). The high space and computation efficiency, combined with adjustable error rate
by tuning parameters, make Bloom filter a preferable probabilistic design base for a lot of
applications.

1.5

Related works

Due to high compactness and time efficiency, Bloom filters have been utilized as probabilistic
key-value stores. One naive approach is that we can store, for each k-v pair, an item that
represents the string (key, value) into the Bloom filter. However, to query a key later, all
the possible values must be tried to construct possible strings for membership tests. This
approach is clearly not scalable when there is a larger number of possible values, hence not
practical. A recent approach [13] using Bloom filters to form a key-value store considers the
problem under the assumption that values are limited in range, and are distributed within
[1, V ], where V is a positive integer. The approach then modifies the conventional Bloom
filter to use cells instead of bits to hold the values directly. If there is a collision in a cell,
this cell is then marked as “Don’t Know (DK)”. To query the value for a key, if at least one
of its k hashed locations has not been marked as DK, the query will be successful. On the
other hand, if all cells are marked as DKs, then the query returns a DK to the user. The
problem with this approach is that it is not designed for arbitrary key-value string pairs, and
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it will also encounter reduced performance (returning many DKs) when more cells become
populated. However, our design of kBF overcomes these two drawbacks by introducing the
encoding and decoding mechanism.
For path reconstruction problem, our design of BFPR is different compared to the
existing ones [69, 63, 48, 33]. Existing path tracing approaches in SDNs are divided into two
main categories: “out-of-band” approach and “in-band” approach [63]. NetSight [33] is one
example of the first category, by sending an after-fact postcard when every packet traverses
each switch in the path. The postcard carries the packet information and the flow entry it
matched. Next the controller collects all postcards and reconstruct the path of all packets.
Considering packet volume and number of switches in large scale SDNs, the postcards cause
too much storage and computation overhead to the control plane. In [3, 68], additional test
packets are injected into network as proxies for the network operation packets. By keep track
of test packets, the paths of network operation packets are reconstructed. However, due to
network dynamics, these approaches may yield incorrect results.
On the other hand, “in-band” approach encodes path information into packet header
while the packets are forwarded in the network [69, 63, 48]. The main challenge of this type
of approach is the balance of packet header space and resources stored on switches, such
as flow entries and network topology. In pathlet tracing [69], ToS octet is used to carry
the path information but 576 flow entries are stored on switches for 4-hop paths in 48-ary
fat-tree topology. While CherryPick [63] only needs 48 flow entries, it uses 11 bits in packet
header. It also makes specific detour assumption when network failure occurs. Furthermore,
both pathlet tracing and CherryPick requires awareness of network topology, which results
that they are difficult to deploy on other types of network topology. Our approach, the
BFPR, however, is at the other spectrum of “in-band” approach, where the BFPR uses
more bits in packet header than CherryPick does, but the BFPR is totally independent of
network forwarding behavior and topology, make the BFPR a more generalized solution to
path tracing.
There are also approaches that utilize multiple packets to reconstruct paths [57, 19].
However, these approaches requires much more packets than the BFPR does, hence they
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can’t work for short flows. Moreover, they can’t work if multiple paths exist between one
pair of hosts, while the BFPR can work correctly according to evaluation experiments.
Ensuring data integrity is essential in data storage and transfer [58]. There are various
mechanisms to protect data from corruption and lost [58]. From hardware perspective,
error correction code (ECC) has been intensively used in detecting data corruption in RAM
devices. However, there are several research studies indicating that ECC is not sufficient [36,
11] and can not be implemented in all devices without causing design complexity and energy
consumption. On clustered file systems, redundant array of inexpensive disks (RAID) is a
predominant approach to provide redundancy and parity to ensure data integrity. However,
RAID is only useful when there are complete and detected disk failures, hence it can only
detect silent data corruption with a certain delay.
From software aspect, the traditional way is through checkpoint/restart (C/R) mechanism.

The same drawback as RAID, C/R can only wok in the case that there is a

detected device failures and after a certain delay. In addition, we need a mechanism to
differentiate which checkpoint files are written before data corruption. Recently, applicationlevel data corruption detection strategies draw much more attention and there are three
major categories: replicated computation based [28], algorithm based [59, 60], and runtime
analysis based [22, 9, 11, 21, 61]. The RedMPI [28] is a typical example in the first category,
which utilizes double, even triple computation resources to run the program concurrently,
and detects anomaly in data by analyzing MPI communication messages and intermediate
computation results. Considering the scale and complexity of computation taken place
on HPC, the double or even triple computation resources is expensive and might affect
the overall system performance. The second category of approaches depend on specific
algorithms that users are running, for example, linear algebra or matrix multiplication,
which is only a subset of all problem, hence obviously they are not general solutions. The
final category of methods try to predict a range that next possible value falls in while the
application program is running, and any findings that are out of this range is considered as
indication of corrupted data.
Compared to aforementioned three categories of data corruption approaches, checksumming, i.e., computing and comparing the previous and newly computed signatures, is a
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straightforward solution which is both application and data independent, hence it is a much
more universal approach. However, traditional methods such as SHA1 and MD5 are both filebased and serial. In the cases of millions of small files or a single terabye-file, checksumming in
parallel is truly preferred. In general, there are two types of parallelism, and the first of which
is parallel hash functions [6, 56]. These approaches, however, are hardly deployed in clustered
systems due to lack of ability to fully exploit the available computation resources. The
alternative is parallel workload [41], i.e., break files into chunks and use multiple processes
to calculate a checksum for each chunk, then aggregate all the checksums to a single datasetlevel signature. The master-slave architecture in [41] is one possible mechanism to distribute
workloads. And Merkle tree [46], which allows different hash subtrees to be computed
without synchronization at the root, is utilized to aggregate all the checksums. However, the
master-slave architecture suffers from tremendous communication overhead between master
and slave workers. On the other hand, the work stealing pattern is a decentralized and
self-organized approach [44, 49], and due to its randomness, Merkle tree is no longer feasible
without a universal sorting.
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Chapter 2
kBF: a probabilistic key-value store
In this chapter, by using the classic Bloom filter as a base design, we extend it into a
approximate key-value storage scheme called the key-value Bloom filter (kBF). Starting from
the problem formulation, we present a comprehensive investigation on the algorithm design
of the kBF, analyze its performance in storing large datasets, and evaluate its performance in
both synthetic workloads and a real application study. According to our experiment results,
the kBF is highly compact, and supports insertion, query, update and deletion operations
with adjustable error ratios. Note that this chapter is based on my published paper: Sisi
Xiong, Yanjun Yao, Qing Cao, and Tian He. kBF: A Bloom Filter for key-value storage
with an application on approximate state machines. INFOCOM, 2014 Proceedings IEEE,
pp.1150-1158.

2.1

Problem formulation

We first present the problem formulation. Assume that we have a collection of n key-value
pairs (ki , vi ), where i ∈ [0, n − 1]. The keys and values can be arbitrary strings. We aim to
develop kBF to support the following four operations for the stored k-v pairs:
• insert(key, value) //insert a key-value pair
• update(key, new value) //update a value for a key
• query(key) //query the value for a key
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Figure 2.1: The kBF algorithm architecture, note that when applicable, the corresponding
section is located under the algorithm block
• delete(key) //delete a key and its associated value

2.2

Design of kBF

In this section, we introduce the design of the kBF. We first present an overview of its
structure, followed by a detailed description of its components and related algorithms.

2.2.1

Architecture Overview

In this section, we present the architecture of kBF, which is shown in the Figure 2.1. This
figure focuses on the insertion and query operations, and we will describe the delete and
update operations later. The overall procedure works as follows. When (key, value) pairs
are inserted, the algorithm first performs an one-to-one conversion from their values to
encoded binary strings, using a secondary kBF (s-kBF) as an assisting component. The
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pairs of the keys and their encodings are then inserted into the main kBF, which serves as
the primary storage for the incoming data. On the other hand, if a key is provided for a
query operation, the main kBF will return a total of k encoded strings. These strings are
fed into a decoding algorithm to obtain the corresponding encoding for the key, which is
further converted into its original value using a polynomial regression based algorithm. The
constructed (key, value) pair will be returned to the user.
In the following sections, we describe the details of this process, including how the
encodings are formulated, the details on specific operations, and the growth/compaction
of kBFs.

2.2.2

Encodings of Values

The central idea of the kBF is that it maps the values, represented by a set V =
{v1 , v2 , ..., vn }, into a set of binary strings. Specifically, such binary strings, denoted as
b[vi ], are constructed according to the following two rules:
• Each value vi has a unique string b[vi ].
• The XOR result of any two strings, i.e., b[vi ]⊕b[vj ], should be unique among themselves,
as well as to the values of b[vi ].
Given n values, the number of their pairwise combinations is C(n, 2), or

n(n−1)
.
2

Therefore,

the minimum length of the binary string, as P , must conform to:

2P ≥

n(n − 1)
+n
2

For example, if there are only four values that need to be encoded, a total of four bits
is sufficient, by encoding them as {0001, 0010, 0100, 1000}, so that their combinations will
not cause any collisions. On the other hand, if n = 100, the theoretically minimal P is
13 (213 > C(100, 2) + 100). Avoiding collisions is important because this way, the pairwise
XOR results can be uniquely decoded. The entire approach is slightly similar to the CDMA
encoding scheme where the XOR operation is also used. We emphasize that the procedure
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for finding encodings only runs once and is done offline. Therefore, powerful computational
resources can be used to find a sufficient number of valid encodings for future uses.
Note that sometimes the minimal value of P may not be achieved. For example, if there
are 7 values, the minimum P is 5. However, through an exhaustive search, with 5 bits,
there is no encoding scheme to fulfill the two requirements mentioned above. Therefore,
we develop a greedy algorithm for finding encodings when the number of values is large.
We do not adopt the exhaustive search due to computational overhead considerations. The
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3. As illustrated, we start the search by setting the first
encoding to 1. We then increase the successive encoding repeatedly by 1. If there is no
collision, then the new encoding is admitted into the set of found encodings. Otherwise, the
next encoding is tested. Figure 2.2 shows the gap between the theoretical minimal value and
the actual value. We also find that even for a large number of encodings, the gap is quite
small. For example, there is a theoretical lower bound of P = 28 for 214 (16, 384) encodings,
and the greedy method is able to find a solution with P = 30.
Algorithm 3 Search Algorithm for Encodings
1: procedure Encoding Search(n)
2:
v0 = 1
3:
insert v0 into a Bloom filter BF
4:
counter ← 2
5:
for j = 1 → n − 1 do
6:
while True do
7:
vj = counter
8:
calculate the XOR result for vj
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:

and vi , for i ∈ [0, j − 1]
if there is no collision for vj then
Insert vj and all XOR results into BF
counter ← counter + 1
break while
else
counter ← counter + 1
end if
end while
end for
end procedure

The Algorithm 3 also adopts an optimization in steps 3 and 9 to speed up the search
process for a large n. This optimization is based on the classic Bloom filter. Specifically, it
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will insert all admitted encodings, as well as their pair-wise XOR results, into a conventional
Bloom filter. For every new encoding being tested, its combinations with existing encodings
are queried against this Bloom filter to determine if it has already been inserted. If yes,
then there is a high probability that a collision has occurred. The algorithm then proceeds
to the next encoding. If a negative result is returned by the Bloom filter, it is guaranteed
that there is no collision for this new encoding because the conventional Bloom filter design
never returns false negatives. This optimization allows each new encoding to be admitted
or rejected in constant time. Therefore, it considerably speeds up our search process.
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Conversions from Values to Encodings

We next describe how values are converted into encodings, which involves a secondary kBF
(s-kBF) that operates on values instead of keys. Specifically, whenever a value needs to
be converted, it is queried against the s-kBF to decide if it has already been assigned
an encoding.

If yes, then the encoding will be used.

Otherwise, a new encoding is

obtained from the pool of available encodings, and is assigned to this value. The pair of
(value, encoding) is then inserted into the s-kBF for later queries. Meanwhile, the reverse
pair of (encoding, value) is stored in a separate lookup table for later conversions from
encodings to values. Because s-kBF only stores (value, encoding) mappings, it is much
smaller than the main kBF. Its operations are exactly the same as the main kBF, as described
in the next section.
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2.2.4

Operations of the kBF

We now describe the central operation blocks of kBF, i.e., their operations. Different from
a conventional Bloom filter, each cell in the kBF consists of two components: a counter and
a possibly superimposed encoding result. The counter keeps track of how many encodings
have been inserted: 0 means the cell is empty, 1 means one encoding has been inserted, and
so on. The encoding part, on the other hand, contains either an original encoding, or the
XOR results of two or more encodings that are mapped to the same cell. In practice, we use
a 32-bit cell with a 3-bit counter and a 29-bit encoding.
Algorithm 4 kBF Insert Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:

procedure Insert(x)
for j = 1 → k do
i ← hj (x)
if Bi .counter == 0 then
Bi .counter ← Bi .counter + 1
Bi .value ← Si
end if
if Bi .counter > 0 then
Bi .counter ← Bi .counter + 1
Bi .value ← Bi .value XOR Si
end if
end for
end procedure

. Insert operation

When the insert occurs, kBF first finds k hashed cells. The counter for each cell is
increased, and the encoding is superimposed into the cells by performing the XOR operation
with the existing contents stored by each cell. Algorithm 4 describes this process.
The second operation, query, works as follows. For each of the k cells, it will obtain the
superimposed encodings as well as their associated counters. The original encoding can be
recovered as long as one of the following two rules is satisfied:
• if one cell has a counter of 1 and stores an original encoding,
• if all cells have counters of more than 1, but the intersection of their stored encoding
sets is unique.
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As an example for the second rule, suppose we have two cells, both of which contain
the superimposition of two encodings. If the first cell contains X and Y , and the second
cell contains X and Z, then the original encoding that hashes to both cells must be X.
Algorithm 5 describes this process. Note that we will describe the details of the decoding
process of step 6 in the next section.
Algorithm 5 kBF Query Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:

procedure Query(x)
for j = 1 → k do
i ← hj (x)
Add Bi .value to StateQueue
end for
State ← Decoding(StateQueue)
return State
end procedure

. Query operation

Algorithm 6 kBF Delete Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

procedure Delete(key, encoding)
for j = 1 → k do
i ← hj (key)
if Bi .counter > 0 then
Bi .counter ← Bi .counter − 1
Bi .value ← Bi .value XOR encoding
else
report error
end if
end for
end procedure

. Delete operation

We next describe the delete operation. This operation is based on our observation that
for any encoding a, a XOR a = 0. Therefore, we can describe this procedure in Algorithm 6.
Finally, we can implement the update algorithm by first querying the key to obtain
its encoding, then delete the key with its encoding, and finally insert the key with its new
encoding. The process can be combined together and Algorithm 7 describes its details.
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Algorithm 7 kBF Update Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:

procedure Update(key, encoding)
encodingold ← Query(key)
for j = 1 → k do
i ← hj (key)
if Bi .counter > 0 then
Bi .value ← Bi .value XOR encodingold
Bi .value ← Bi .value XOR encoding
end if
end for
end procedure

2.2.5

. Update operation

Decoding Superimposed Encodings

We next describe how to obtain original encodings from their superimposed results. Given
the way we constructed the encodings, we can always obtain unique results if only two of
them are superimposed. For more than two encodings’ XOR results, we may obtain multiple
possible solutions.
Therefore, the critical step is, given the number of items and their XORed result, how to
obtain all possible combinations of original encodings. We first consider the simple case: if
there is an XOR result for two encodings X and Y , then there are two possibilities: if X = Y ,
the XOR result is 0. This is impossible to decode because any X may be possible. If X 6= Y ,
then a unique set of {X, Y } can be found. By pre-constructing a Bloom filter that has all
encodings, we can find this unique set in O(N ), by iterating through all items, calculating
its XOR result with X ⊕ Y , and checking if the result can be found in the pre-constructed
Bloom filter.
We now consider the more complicated case where three encodings are hashed to the
same cell. Since we only know their XOR result, and the encoding scheme we designed
earlier does not guarantee that the encodings give unique values when three or more of them
are combined, we only provide an opportunistic approach for three-item decoding. For more
than three items that are mapped to the same cell, we consider the cell to be non-decodable 1 .
1

Note that this cell may become decodable again when a delete operation occurs, causing one item from
this cell to be canceled out.
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The opportunistic algorithm works as follows. For all available encodings, we store all
the pair-wise XOR results of them into a Bloom filter L. We denote the XOR result as R,
and we know that R = X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z, for unknown X, Y , and Z. During the decoding phase,
we iterate through all encodings. For each encoding E, we calculate E ⊕ R. If E = X, we
know that E ⊕ R = Y ⊕ Z. Therefore, we can use the filter L to check if E ⊕ R exists. If
yes, then there is a hit, and we can find Y and Z as they are unique. Finally, we return the
set of all found (X, Y, Z) as the result.

2.2.6

Growth and Compaction of kBFs

Just like a normal BF, a kBF has its capacity in terms of how many item insertions it is
able to support at most. Although its capacity can be statically allocated if we know the
maximum number of k-v pairs, in real applications, it happens that we do not know such
information in advance. Therefore, we present the growth and compaction operations of
kBFs for dynamic operations.
For the growth operation, we monitor the number of inserted k-v pairs for a constructed
kBF. Whenever this reaches near its maximum, we can allocate another kBF of the same size
for new k-v pairs. On the other hand, if we detect that an existing kBF has too few active
k-v pairs after repeated deletions, we can start the compaction operation. This operation
is facilitated by the bit-vector nature of kBFs. Given two k-v sets, suppose that they are
represented by two kBFs, L1 and L2 , we can calculate the kBF that represents the union set
L = L1 ∪L2 by taking the XOR operation of their kBF cells: CellL = CellL1 ⊕CellL2 . For the
counters, we can add them together to become the counter for the new cells. Observe that
a tradeoff of this operation is that at the same time it saves memory space in compaction,
it will lose some information during the XOR operations.

2.2.7

Conversion from Encodings to Values

The final step in the operation is to convert encodings to values for query results. To this
end, recall that we maintained a table of (encoding, value) mappings when encodings are
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created for values. In this table, all encodings in the table are sorted in the ascending order
to simplify the lookup process later.
To save memory accesses,given the encoding, instead of using a conventional binary search
to find the value for an encoding, we follow a regression approach in this step. Specifically, as
illustrated in Figure 2.3, valid encoding values usually form a curve that can be approximated
with a polynomial function. We choose a quadratic function for this approximation, i.e., we
find y = f (x), where x ∈ [0, n − 1] as the index, and y is the encoding value. We then
find the inverse function x = f −1 (y), so that we can calculate the index given the value of
the encoding. Once the index is found, the string for the value in (key, value) pairs can be
directly found by using the index to access the mapping table.
However, one challenge is that the f function is not 100% accurate. To find the true
location after calculating the index, we search from the index by observing that the average
step increase of the encoding values can be determined in advance. Then, based on the
difference of the currently found encoding and the target encoding, we can divide it by the
average step of encodings, and move the index accordingly, until the index finds the true
encoding value. We describe this procedure through an example. Suppose we have a table of
10, 000 encodings, and find its quadratic function as f (x) = 92884900 + 32952.9x + 1.151x2 .
The average step of all encodings is 44294, which is pre-determined. Let us suppose, in
one query, the encoding returned is 237551267. According to this formula, the first index
is found as 3868. By accessing the encoding corresponding to the location 3868, we find it
as 237525822, which has an error of 25445 compared to the target encoding being searched.
By using the average step size, the index will search using a step of 1. After two steps, the
true index is found at 3870. This way, only three memory accesses are needed to find the
encoding index and its associated value, which is much faster than the binary search method
with an average number of memory accesses of 14.

2.3

Analysis of kBF

In this section, we analyze the capacity and error rate of kBF using a theoretical analysis.
The challenge of this analysis is that a Bloom filter is constructed using several parameters,
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including its size m, the number of hashing functions k, and the number of k-v pairs n.
It has been pointed out that to minimize the false positive rate, there exists an optimal k
given a pair of n and m, where kopt =

m
n

ln(2) [64]. On the other hand, to maintain the false

positive rate of the filter below a threshold p, we know that
m=−

n ln p
.
(ln(2))2

This formula shows that the parameter m must grow linearly with the size of n, or
conversely, given an m, there exists an upperbound of n, over which the false positive rate
can no longer be sustained. We can therefore define the following concept of capacity.
Definition 2.1. The p-capacity of a Bloom filter is defined as the maximum number of items
that can be inserted without violating the false positive probability p.
It is clear that the p-capacity can be derived using
m(ln(2))2
.
p-capacity = −
(ln(p))
Also observe that when p-capacity is reached, the optimal number of hashing functions k
is only related to p, as k = − ln(p)
. In the kBF, whenever there are too many items inserted,
ln(2)
we will allocate a new kBF with the same size. Therefore, we can guarantee that the false
positive rate of each kBF will not be larger than p.
Now we derive the distribution of encoding superimposition for a kBF. Assume that this
kBF has been inserted with n items. We use c(i) to denote the number of encodings that
are inserted into the ith cell. If this number is 3 or more, we consider that this cell is nondecodable. The probability that this counter is incremented j times is a binomial random
variable as
 
nk 1 j
1
P (c(i) = j) =
( ) (1 − )nk−j .
j
m
m
Therefore, the probability that any counter is at least j is
Xnk nk  1
1
P (c(i) ≥ j) =
( )i (1 − )nk−i .
i=j
i
m
m
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Although it is relatively hard to obtain the closed form results for this particular function,
we simplify it by observing in our setting, the value of nk and m are both quite large.
Therefore, we can use the extreme limits of the formulas (by calculating n → ∞ and m → ∞)
to approximate their original forms. We also use numerical results to demonstrate that this
approach is indeed accurate.
The key observation we use to simplify the derivation comes from [39]. The result is
concerned with the urn-ball model, of which our model of a Bloom filter is a special case.
Specifically, it states that if n balls are randomly assigned into m urns, and that each ball is
equally likely to fall into any of the urns, suppose we use Mr to denote the number of urns
containing r balls after the assignments are completed, we have that
 
n 1 r
1
E[Mr ] = m
( ) (1 − )n−r
r m
m

(r = 0, 1, ..., n).

If n, m → ∞, with nm−1 → λ < ∞, then,
lim E[m−1 Mr ] =

n→∞

λr −λ
e .
r!

Apparently, for the case of a Bloom filter, we have nk hashing operations. Therefore, we
should replace n in the formula above with nk instead. Also, by observing that P (c(i) =
j) = Mr /m, we know that
λj −λ
lim P (c(i) = j) = e .
n→∞
j!
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Next, we consider the scenario that a Bloom filter has not yet reached its p-capacity.
Therefore, we have,
nk
≤ ln(2)
m
On the other hand, if a Bloom filter has exceeded its p-capacity, we can define an
additional parameter, ρ, as the capacity coefficient. That is, we can set
nk
= ln(2) × ρ
m
Based on this, we can obtain that
lim P (c(i) = j) =

n→∞

(ρ ln(2))j
× 2−ρ .
j!

Next, we can estimate the probability of three or more encodings combined together,
which we deem as non-decodable. Note that this is a simplified over-estimate, because for
such cases, we can still obtain multiple candidate sets, and it is possible that we can decode
them with more computational overhead. Therefore, the results here serve as a lower-bound
(a pessimistic value) on the capacity of a kBF. We can find this probability by
n
X

P (c(i) = j) =

j=3
−ρ−1

(2ρ+1 Γ(n + 1, ρ(ln(2))))
−
Γ(n + 1)
2−ρ−1 (ρ2 (ln(2)2 ) + ρ(ln(4)) + 2) Γ(n + 1)
.
Γ(n + 1)

2

In this formula, the Γ stands for the gamma function. Its limit happens to be closed form
as
Pn (ρ) = lim

n→∞

n
X

P (c(i) = j))

j=3



= 2−ρ−1 −ρ2 ln(2)2 + 2ρ+1 − ρ(ln(4)) − 2 .
To verify, for the non-decodable probability of a single cell, we calculate the numerical
results and plot them in Figure 2.4. Observe that the actual non-decodable probability for
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a single cell is concentrated around 0.0333313, which is the same as the predicted value of
Pn (1) as 0.0333132. This results shows that for a single cell, if the kBF has not reached its
p-capacity, the probability that it has three or more encodings stored is no more than 3.33%,
which is independent of the value of p.
Now we calculate the global decodability. We can mathematically write this as
1 − [Pn (ρ)k + k × Pn (ρ)k−1 × (P (c(i) = 2))].
The results for this probability with different k values are plotted in Figure 2.5. Observe
here, for k = 10, to maintain that virtually all decoding operations as successful (success
rate is almost 1), we can only overload ρ to be less than 2.

2.4

Distributed Key-Value Bloom Filter

To accommodate even more data, in this section, we describe how we develop a distributed
key-value storage system based on the kBF. Different from the centralized kBF, such storage
is no longer limited to a single machine or a storage device. Instead, the data are distributed
over multiple servers that will collectively provide storage needs.
In our design of the distributed kBF, we follow a similar approach just like the centralized
kBF in that we do not require the returned key-values to be 100% accurate, so that we can
achieve a tradeoff between speed and error rates. We call the resulting design as d-kBF.
The same as the kBF, the d-kBF could find its applications in distributed storage systems
with a tolerance of low probability of errors. As mentioned above, one typical application is
the cache system, the same with Memcached, whose primary purpose is to speed up system
responses. In the following, we first present its architecture, followed by its implementation
details.

2.4.1

Architecture of d-kBF

The architecture of d-kBF is shown in Figure 2.6, where the whole d-kBF is represented by
multiple slabs, which is the same as the centralized kBF, stored on multiple slab servers.
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Figure 2.6: Distributed Key-Value Bloom Filter Architecture
Here, each slab keeps track of a collection of (key,value) pairs. There is a frontend master
server and multiple backend slab servers. The master server is responsible for allocating new
slabs and deleting empty slabs, while at the same time, it keeps track of all slab locations.
There are several slabs stored in the memory of one storage server. Note that for loadbalancing purposes, slabs can also migrate between servers.
We next describe how we implement distributed operations in the d-kBF, including insert,
query, delete and update, with the usage of slabs. We use a two-step hashing approach for
this purpose. The first-step hashing locates a slab for the k-v pair based on the hashing value
of the key. Once the slab is located, the client will query the master node on the current
location of this slab. Then, the client will communicate with the slab server directly, where
the second-step operation is the same as the centralized kBF.

2.4.2

Load balance

In cloud-computing environments, we assume that each storage server has same storage
capacity. To deal with load balance, we want to achieve the scenario where each server has
nearly the same number of k-v pairs stored. At the beginning, the master will assign the
same number of slabs to each storage server. Note that as long as the first step hashing
function of the d-kBF operation is uniformly distributed, after insertion of first batch of
data, the number of k-v pairs in each slab should be almost the same. Therefore, storage
imbalances across slabs can be effectively prevented in the early stage of the d-kBF.
However, after more datasets and more operations are performed, some slabs will have
more k-v pairs stored than others do. One approach to address this problem is slab migration,
where we allow slabs to move between servers. However, finding the optimal solution to the
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Algorithm 8 Query balancing algorithm
1: procedure Querybalance(q)
2:
counter ← 1
3:
calculate the number of total queries for each slab
4:
calculate the number of total queries for each server
5:
calculate the current load imbalance metric ρ
6:
while True do
7:
find one slab Smax on a most queried server
8:
find one slab Smin on the least queried server
9:
predicate the new imbalance metric ρnew
10:
if ρnew > ρ then
11:
break while
12:
else if counter ≥ Cmax then
13:
break while
14:
else
15:
exchange the two slabs
16:
ρ ← ρnew
17:
counter ← counter + 1
18:
end if
19:
end while
20: end procedure

slab assignment based on their load is NP-hard, as this is equivalent to the bin-packing or
knapsack problem. Therefore, we develop a greedy algorithm to achieve query balances, as
shown in Algorithm 8.
The load balance algorithm works as follows. The master node will perform re-balancing
operations periodically with an interval of T . At the end of each interval, master node
calculates the aggregate number of k-v pairs for each slab and each server. To measure the
imbalance, we use a metric ρ, by dividing the standard deviation over the average value.
The larger ρ is, the more imbalanced the server storage are. The goal of balance algorithm is
to achieve a lower ρ, by migrating slabs from heavily loaded servers to the less loaded ones.
In each step of migration, we first choose two slabs, one is the most loaded slab in the
most heavily loaded server, and the second one is the least loaded slab in the least loaded
server. Before making the actual exchange, we calculate the new imbalance metric ρnew after
migration. If there is an improvement, i.e. a lower ρ, the master node informs the two slab
servers to make exchanges, and updates their metadata accordingly. In addition, to avoid too
much overhead, we allow a second parameter, Cmax , that determines the maximum number
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of exchanges that can be incurred at the end of each period. When the maximum of slab
exchange is achieved, the lowest ρ will be returned.
In terms of time complexity of Algorithm 8, we consider that both the number of servers
and the number of slabs on each server is constant, therefore calculating the load imbalance
metric ρ, as well as finding the most heavily loaded slab and sever takes constant time.
Hence, the time complexity depends on the maximum number of exchange, Cmax . Based on
our experiments, Cmax = 10 is an appropriate choice.

2.5

Experiment Evaluation

In this section, we systematically present the evaluation of the kBF. Due to the probabilistic
nature of the kBF, we first focus on its errors. Specifically, there are three types of errors:
false positives, false negatives, and incorrect outputs. Next, we focus on the performance
of the kBF in terms of its memory overhead. A larger memory allocation (where the m
increases) will provide a higher capacity, which in turn reduces ρ and the non-decodability
probability.
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2.5.1

Workload Generation

We generate the workload for the experiments based on the conclusions from a realistic study
by researchers at Facebook [7]. Specifically, they studied several Memcached pools, and found
the statistical distribution of the largest pool that contains general purpose key-value pairs.
The key-size distribution in terms of bytes was found to be Generalized Extreme Value
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distribution with parameters µ = 30.7984, σ = 8.20449, and k = 0.078688. The value-size
distribution, starting from 15 bytes, were found to be Generalized Pareto with parameters
θ = 0, σ = 214.476, and k = 0.348238. The first 15 bytes follow a discrete distribution with
a specific table (shown in [7]).
We generate 10 million key-value pairs where the size of keys follow these reported
statistical parameters. The values are intended to be the most frequent ones, where a total
of 3000 unique values are used. Note that such frequent values will typically constitute a
majority of the (key, value) instances, for which the kBF is targeted at. In this evaluation,
we keep the specific keys and values random, so that the evaluation results are the most
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generic. The number of keys n inserted to the kBF is 10 million, and we use a false positive
probability p to be between 0.001 to 0.000001 when we construct the Bloom filter. Therefore,
the number of hash functions k, the size of kBF m and the maximum load factor ρ can be
decided. To test the case when kBF has been overloaded, we also conduct the experiments
for the size of kBF m0 to be m/2 to analyze the performance difference. The entire kBF
takes between 0.5G to 1.5G bytes of RAM to build on a modern workstation, depending on
the parameter selection.

2.5.2

Evaluation Results

First, to obtain the false negative error rate and the incorrect output rate, we start by
inserting all 10 million keys into a constructed kBF, and then query each key for its value.
We find that in this case, the incorrect output error is always zero. This can be explained
by that as the filter has not been saturated, all decodings are correct if they are decodable
at all. The false negative error rate, on the other hand, is plotted in Figure 2.7. According
to the figure, the false negative errors almost do not exist if the p-capacity is not violated.
On the other hand, if the size of the filter m is decreased by half, for larger p values, the
false negative errors are more frequent, meaning that the decoding process gives more null
results. This is as expected, as in this case, the filter is over-crowded.
To obtain the false positive error rate, i.e., the rate of obtaining valid values for incorrect
keys, we generate another 10 million non-existent keys, and query them over a kBF that is
populated with the first 10 million keys. If the kBF ever returns a valid encoding, we consider
this as a false positive error. The results are shown in Figure 2.8. Observe that if the pcapacity is not violated, the false positive rate is close to the value of p (the conventional
Bloom filter false positive rate) in their order of magnitude. On the other hand, if the size of
m is reduced by half, the false positive rate becomes higher, as we expected. We next plot
the overhead in terms of memory usage in Figure 2.9. Observe that a smaller p leads to a
larger memory usage, which obtains, in turn, better performance in terms of error rates. We
next investigate the effects of deletions of keys. Specifically, we delete the 10 million inserted
keys in batches, each has 1 million keys. We then query the deleted keys after each deletion,
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and plot the false positive ratios. Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 show the results. Observe
that for a smaller p, the performance tends to be much better.
Finally, we evaluate the effects of update operations. Similar to the delete operations,
we update keys with new values in batches. Note that here, instead of calculating the false
positives, we are interested in false negatives, which refer to null values or incorrect values.
The results are plotted in Figure 2.12 and Figure 2.13. Observe again that the performance
will be much better for smaller p values and larger m sizes.

2.6

Application Case Study: TCP Flow Analysis

In this section, we describe how to use the kBF for a real application. We implement an
Approximate Concurrent State Machine (ACSM) [13] based on the kBF, and compare it
with the original approach in [13], which we refer to as the state-based Bloom filter (sBF).
For our evaluation, we choose a real dataset from CAIDA [1], which includes an hour length
of traffic data. The pair of the source and destination IP address is used as flow-id, and the
TCP flag is used as the state.
Specifically, the experiment has the goal of locating suspicious TCP flows by using TCP
flags. This technique has been utilized in different network monitoring scenarios, such as
SNORT database [2] and TCP SYN flooding attacks [34]. Whenever the specified TCP flags
indicate potential problems, a warning can be generated. For example, when the “RST” bit
and “FIN” bit are set, which means to reset and to terminate the TCP connection, it may
indicate potential attack [34].
To detect such problems, we emulate the state transitions of TCP flows with ACSMs.
Whenever a flow is encountered, we query the flow on its state. If it is a new flow, we insert
this flow and its state into the kBF (or sBF [13]). If this flow is old, we will selectively
update its state depending on the flow information. When a flow terminates, we delete its
state information. All insert, update, query, and delete operations are readily supported
by both kBF and sBF, because in this case, the number of states is usually very small. To
compare them, we choose four different preset false positive probability p from 0.1 to 0.00001
to conduct experiments. The total number of flows, n, is 908522.
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The first type of errors, false positives, is related to the membership tests of Bloom filters.
Here, a new flow is detected, and queried against the filter. However, the kBF or the sBF
returns that the flow is old, and will fail to insert the flow and its state information, due
to a false positive error. The second and third types of errors, false negatives and incorrect
outputs, indicate that the kBF or sBF returns a null state or an incorrect state for a valid
flow. This may be caused by decoding failures, or for those flows that failed to be inserted
due to false positives.
The performance gap between the kBF and the sBF is mainly in false negative errors.
According to Figure 2.14, as the preset p value decreases, false negative errors of kBF
decreases dramatically. However, false negative errors of sBF almost stay constant, due
to that it simply returns null value for those cells with two or more flows. Furthermore, in
its update process, false negative errors will accumulate due to previous overlappings, which
leads to almost invariant false negative errors even though the size of Bloom filter increases.
The kBF, in contrast, still maintains part of the flow information even when three or more
encodings are superimposed, as individual encodings can still be recovered later if delete
operations occur. Figure 2.15 shows the total errors of kBF and sBF. Again, we observe
that kBF performs much better in terms of reducing errors.
Finally, in terms of finding suspicious flows with certain TCP flags, after querying state
of each flow, we find that there are 900 and 1658 flows with the flags of FIN and RST
accordingly in the dataset. These flows can be marked with suspicious for further analysis.
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Chapter 3
BFPR: Bloom filter based path
reconstruction approach
In this chapter, by interpreting a path as a set of key-value pairs, we transform the path
reconstruction problem to a two-step key-value store: when packets are transmitted in
network, the path information, i.e., the key-value pairs, are encoded, or “insert” to a
key-value store, which is encapsulated into packet header, while at the destination host,
the key-value pairs are decoded, or “queried” from the key-value store, hence the path is
reconstructed. To this end, we propose the Bloom filter based path reconstruction approach
(BFPR), and we present the detailed design of path information encoding and decoding.

3.1

Problem formulation

A simple 3-tier data center topology is shown in Figure 3.1 [10]. Observe there are two
possible paths between source host h1 and destination host h3 : S5 → S3 → S1 → S4 → S7
and S5 → S3 → S2 → S4 → S7 . The path reconstruction problem is to recover paths that
packets travel through, i.e., switches along each path. In our problem formulation, we require
no knowledge of network topology, except total number of switches and their IDs. Hence
our approach works for multiple topology types, ranging from classical 3-tier, to fat-tree,
to other types of topology, such as the Facebook fabric [24]. Moreover, we don’t make any
assumptions about routing policies.
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Figure 3.1: Paths from host 1 to host 3.

3.2

Design

In this section, we present the design of Bloom filter based path reconstruction approach
(BFPR), based on the following two insights:
Key insight slowromancapi@: We represent a path as a set of key-value pairs, where
the keys are switch IDs along the path, and the values are orders associate with each switch.
For example, as in Figure 3.1, the path, S5 → S3 → S1 → S4 → S7 , is represented by a set
of key-value pairs, {{S5 , 1}, {S3 , 2}, {S1 , 3}, {S4 , 4}, {S7 , 5}}, indicating that S5 is the first
hop, S3 is the second hop, S1 is the third hop, S4 is the fourth hop, and S7 is the fifth hop.
In this way, we transform the path reconstruction problem to a variant of key-value store
problem. However, there is a major difference between the two problems: the destination
host needs to recover not only the keys but also the values, while in classic key-value store,
usually the keys are given and are queried for their corresponding values. Therefore, we utilize
two Bloom filters, BF and BFS , to store the path information, which will be discussed in
Section 3.2.2.
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Figure 3.2: The BFPR design overview.
Key insight slowromancapii@: Due to limited packet header space, the size of the
Bloom filters should be scalable: it should not increase linearly as the path length increases.
To achieve this, we utilize a method based on random sampling, i.e., we use a group of
packets, which travel along the same path between the source and destination hosts, to
reconstruct the path. Each packet encodes a subset of all key-value pairs that represent the
path, i.e., path segments, to packet header, which is then decoded at destination host. When
enough packets are received, the destination host can reconstruct the entire path by putting
multiple path segments together.

3.2.1

Design overview

The path encoding and reconstruction process is shown in Figure 3.2. The source host
sends out packets, whose headers contain information such as source host addresses and
packet sequence numbers. There are two separate components in the BFPR: an encoder
located on the SDN controller and a decoder located on the destination host. When packets
are transmitted in the network, they are forwarded to the SDN controller to encode path
information, i.e., (switchID, order) pair, into packet header. Note that we make the
assumption that the SDN controller has no awareness of the network topology, hence the
switch ID information can only be obtained through OpenFlow packet in packets, and the
packets need to be sent to the controller at each hop. However, if the controller is aware of
the network topology, it can send out f low mod messages to install flow entries on switches.
In such a way, the packet header updates can be done on switches locally without causing
potential delay.
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Figure 3.3: Reconstruct the path using multiple packets.
When the destination host receives packets, it decodes packet headers to reconstruct
paths. The fields that the BFPR needs to encode path information include the two Bloom
filters, BF and BFS , and a path length count len, and all of them are initialized to all 0s at
source host.
In the following, we describe the BFPR in three sections: encoding paths while packets
are transmitted in the network, decoding path segments, and putting together the entire
path at the destination host.

3.2.2

In-network packet header update

At each hop in the network, the controller encodes path information into packet headers
according to Algorithm 9.
Update BF . Each switch’s information, (switchID,order) pair, is inserted to BF , of
which length is m1 and there are k1 hash functions. The order is inferred by len.
Update BFS . At each hop, the controller first utilizes the packet sequence number to
determine whether to insert the switch ID to BFS or not, of which length is m2 and there
are k2 hash functions. If a switch is chosen, the controller inserts switchID to BFS .
Note that BF and BFS have different number of hash functions, due to that different
number of items are inserted to them. For BF , the number of items inserted is all hops
along the path, while for BFS , the number of items inserted is only one subset of hops of
the path.
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Algorithm 9 In-network packet header update
1: procedure Packet header update(BF, BFS , len)
2:
key = switchID
3:
value = len
4:
for j = 1 → k1 do
5:
i ← hj (key, value)
6:
BF (i) = 1
7:
end for
8:
V = unranking(seqID) = {v1 , v2 , ...vr }
9:
if value is in V then
10:
for j = 1 → k2 do
11:
i ← hj (key)
12:
BFS (i) = 1
13:
end for
14:
end if
15:
len ← len + 1
16: end procedure

. Insert (key, value) to BF

. Insert (key) to BFS

Update len. The len is added by 1 at each hop.
The key problem is to determine which switches are chosen in a way so that different
packets encode different sections of the path with a high probability. For example, as shown
in Figure 3.3, to recover the path from host h1 to host h3 , we utilize three packets, packet 0, 1
and 2. Suppose that packet 0 encodes (S5 , 1) and (S4 , 4), packet 1 encodes (S1 , 2) and (S7 , 5),
and packet (S1 , 3) and (S7 , 5). Hence the destination host needs to obtain the complete path
by combining these different sections together.
To solve this problem, we use the combination ranking and unranking algorithm [40]. The
combination ranking algorithm is to assign indexes, {0, 1, 2, ..., M − 1}, to all combinatorial

objects when choosing r different numbers out of n numbers, where M = nr . The unranking
algorithm works in the reverse way, where given an index ranging from 0 to M − 1, the goal
is to obtain the corresponding combinatorial object, which is r different numbers out of n
numbers. For example, we choose 2 numbers from {1, 2, 3, 4}, and give each combinatorial
object an index using teh ranking algorithm, as shown in Table 3.1. The unranking algorithm

is that given a number ranging from 0 to 5 ( 42 = 6), for example, 2, we obtain the
combinatorial object {1, 4}.
Here, in our problem, the index is a seed determined by the packet sequence number,
the n numbers are all switch orders in the path, and the r numbers are the orders of those
switches that are chosen to insert their IDs to BFS .
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Table 3.1: Ranking and unranking combinations
Index
0
1
2
3
4
5

Combinatorial object
{1,2}
{1,3}
{1,4}
{2,3}
{2,4}
{3,4}

Since the path length is unknown until the packet arrives at the destination host, we
set n to be nmax , which is the number of hops of the longest path in the network. Note r
is determined by the number of switches in the network and BFS parameters to ensure a
satisfactory decoding success ratio, which will be discussed in Section 3.3.1.
Therefore, here are steps of how to decide whether the switch information is encoded to
BFS . First, we obtain the seed by calculating the hash value of the packet sequence number

modulo nmax
. Next, we utilize the seed to perform the unranking algorithm and obtain a
r
combinatorial object containing r numbers, which represents the hops that are inserted to
BFS . Next, the controller checks the switch order, if it is one of the r numbers, it inserts
the switch ID to BFS .

3.2.3

Decoding segments of the path

At the destination host, there are three steps in decoding path segments: decoding switch
IDs (keys), decoding orders (values), and mapping keys and values correctly. The algorithm
is shown in Algorithm 10.
Decode switch IDs (keys): The destination host first recovers the r switch IDs that
are inserted to BFS . The naive way is to go through all switch IDs in the network and check
whether each of them is in BFS . However, this method is very time-consuming. Hence, we
develop the pre-computed Bloom filter table, denote as BF T , to achieve time efficiency in
decoding switch IDs process.
The idea of pre-computed Bloom filter table is that at the destination host, we first insert
all switch IDs to the Bloom filter table, which has the same parameters as BFS . However,
in each cell of Bloom filter table, instead of a single bit, we have an array that stores all
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Algorithm 10 Decoding path segments
1: procedure Decode Path Segments(packet)
2:
Segments = N U LL
3:
K = {N U LL}
4:
for i = 1 → m2 do
5:
if BFS (i) == 1 then
6:
K = K ∪ {BF T (i)}
7:
end if
8:
end for
9:
{(key1 , c1 ), ..., (keyj , cj )} = Histogram(K)
10:
K = {N U LL}
11:
for i = 1 → j do
12:
if ci == k2 then
13:
K = K ∪ {keyi }
14:
end if
15:
end for
16:
V = unranking(seqID) = {v1 , v2 , ...vr }
17:
for each keyi in K do
18:
count = 0
19:
for each vj in V do
20:
if (keyi , vj ) is in BF then
21:
count ← count + 1
22:
end if
23:
end for
24:
if count == 1 then
25:
Segments = Segments ∪ {(keyi , vj )}
26:
end if
27:
end for
28:
return Segments
29: end procedure

. Decode keys

. Decode values
. Map keys and values
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Figure 3.4: Use BF T to recover the nodes.
switch IDs that have been hashed to this position. For example, as shown in the left part
in Figure 3.4, S0 has been hashed to position 0, 2 and 8, then we insert S0 to corresponding
cells in the Bloom filter table. After inserting all switch IDs, the Bloom filter table has been
built completely.
When a packet arrives, the destination host checks which positions have been set to 1 in
BFS . After looking up the BF T , we get a super-set of arrays of switch IDs that are stored
in those corresponding positions in the BF T . If a switch ID occurs in the super-set k2 times,
we consider that it has been inserted to BFS . As shown in the right part of Figure 3.4, the
positions in BFS , 0, 1, 3, 4, 6 and 9, have been set to 1, after looking up the Bloom filter
table, the destination host gets the super-set as {S0 , S2 , S1 , S2 , S4 , S1 , S2 , S1 , S3 }, in which
{S1 , S2 } have appeared 3 (which is the number of hash functions used in BFS and BF T )
times, hence we consider {S1 , S2 } are inserted to BFS .
Decode the orders (values): The destination host performs the same unranking
algorithm described in Section 3.2.2 to obtain a set of orders, which are orders of the switches
whose IDs are inserted to BFS .
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Map switch IDs and orders: After decoding the keys and the values, the destination
host gets a set of switch IDs and a set of orders. Next we utilize BF to map the two sets to
get (switchID, order) pairs to obtain path segments. In particular, we query all possible
pairs from the two sets and check whether each pair is in BF . If a switch ID has only one
key-value pair that is in BF , we consider this pair is a path segment.
Take pkt0 as an example, after decoding BFS and performing the unranking algorithm,
we get the switch IDs as {S4 , S5 }, and the orders as {1, 4}. Then we query BF , using all
possible pairs, (S4 , 1), (S4 , 4), (S5 , 1), (S5 , 4). If (S4 , 4) is in BF and (S4 , 1) is not, we consider
that S4 is the fourth hop in the path. However, if both (S4 , 1) and (S4 , 4) are in BF , we
discard S4 since there are collisions. If neither (S4 , 1) or (S4 , 4) is in BF , we can infer that
S4 is a false positive error when decoding BFS .

3.2.4

Stitch together the entire path

Algorithm 11 Reconstruct paths using multiple packets
1: procedure Decoding(packets(1, 2, ..., p))
2:
idx = 0
3:
mapP athID = N U LL
4:
mapP athResult = N U LL
5:
while packet(src, len, BF, BFS , seqID) do
6:
pathID = mapP athID.query((src, len, BF ))
7:
if pathID == N U LL then
8:
pathID = idx
9:
mapP athID.insert((src, len, BF ), pathID)
10:
mapP athResult.insert(pathID, (−1, −1, ..., −1))
11:
idx ← idx + 1
12:
else
13:
pathResult = mapP athResult.query(pathID)
14:
end if
15:
{(k1 , v1 ), ..., (kn , vn )} = DecodeSegments(packet)
16:
for i = 1 → n do
17:
pathResult(vi ) = ki
18:
mapP athResult.upate(pathID, pathResult)
19:
end for
20:
end while
21: end procedure

In most scenarios, packets that arrive at the destination host may be sent by different
source hosts. Furthermore, there might be different paths between the same pair of source
and destination hosts. Therefore, the destination host needs a path identifier to put packets
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Figure 3.5: Putting packets that travel from h1 to h3 into packet groups.
into packet groups, in which all packets travel along the same path. For example, as shown
in Figure 3.5, there are two paths between h1 and h3 , and a packet might travel through
either of the two paths. By using a path identifier, the destination host first puts pkt0 , pkt1
and pkt2 into one packet group and put their decoded path segments together to obtain the
first path. Similarly, pkt3 , pkt4 and pkt5 are put into another packet group and the second
path can be reconstructed.
For the path identifier, we use (src, len, BF ), which are the source host address, path
length and the Bloom filter that all key-value pairs have been inserted into.
The path reconstruction using multiple packets is shown in Algorithm 11. At first, two
mappings are built: one is the mapping between (src, len, BF) and the path ID number,
the other one is the mapping between the path ID number and path reconstruction result.
When the destination host receives a packet, it first extracts the (src, len, BF) in the
packet header and queries the first mapping. If an invalid path ID number is returned, it
indicates that this packet travels through a new path and a new path ID number is assigned.
Otherwise, we utilize the valid path ID number to query the second mapping to obtain
previous reconstruction result. We then decode the packet and update the reconstruction
result with decoded path segments. After decoding enough packets in each path group,
the entire path can be reconstructed. We analyze that how many packets are needed to
reconstruct the path in terms of path length and network scale in Section 3.3.2.
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3.3

Analysis

In this section, we analyze how to set the BFPR parameters properly, including the number
of hash functions and the number of switch IDs that are inserted to BFS . Additionally, we
give an expectation number of how many packets are needed to reconstruct a path in terms
of path length.
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3.3.1

Figure 3.7: Variation of
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path reconstruction success Figure 3.8:
probability as number of packets needed in terms of
path length with different r.
packets increases.

Determine Bloom filter parameters

To set parameters properly of BF and BFS , we first identify Bloom filter size and number of
items inserted to them. The Bloom filter size, i.e., the length of the bit array, depends on the
available packet header space. For example, we implement the BFPR in OpenFlow-enabled
network, and the 16-bit IP ID and the 12-bit VLAN ID are chosen to be BF and BFS
accordingly. On the other hand, the number of items inserted to BF is the total number of
switch IDs in the path. Therefore, we calculate the number of hash functions, k1 , according
to equations in [14], as the least false positive errors can be achieved.
Next, we analyze that how many switch IDs should be inserted to BFS to ensure a high
probability of decoding success, which is the case that when querying BFS , the switch IDs
except those that are actually inserted to BFS , are returned as not in BFS , i.e., none of them
has false positive errors. According to [14], we obtain the false positive error probability,
pf p , of BFS as:
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pf p = (1 − (1 −

1 k2 r k2
) ) ,
m2

(3.1)

where m2 is Bloom filter size, k2 is number of hash functions and r is number of switch
IDs inserted to BFS . Hence, the probability of recover success of is:
pr = (1 − pf p )(N −r) ,

(3.2)

where N is total number of switches in the network. Note that pr is a mono-decreasing
function with respect to pf p . Therefore, we set k2 to the value to achieve the minimum
false positive probability, which is k2 = ln 2 mr2 [64]. Suppose there are 8 switches in the
network, we plot the variation of pr as r increases with different values of m2 , which is shown
in Figure 3.6. As we can observe, when m2 is chosen to be 12, in order to ensure a high
probability of recover success (greater than 0.6), the number of switch IDs inserted to BFS
should not be larger than 2.

3.3.2

Number of packets needed to recover a path

As mentioned in the design section, the BFPR requires multiple packets to reconstruct paths.
Therefore, in order to investigate whether the BFPR works for short (mice) flows, we analyze
the number of packets needed to reconstruct path in terms of path length. More formally,
we have the following question:
Given an SDN network where the longest path has nmax hops, and r different switch IDs
are encoded into BFS in each packet. Suppose that all packets are decoded to get correct
path segments, how many packets are needed to reconstruct a path that has n hops?
First, for a particular hop, the probability of one packet encodes its information is
Hence the probability of a packet doesn’t encode its information is 1 −

r
.
nmax

r
.
nmax

Suppose there

are p packets that travel along the path. The probability of none of these packets encodes a
particular hop’s information is
(1 −

r
nmax

)p .

Therefore, the probability of at least one packet encodes this hop’s information is
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1 − (1 −

r
nmax

)p .

There are n hops, if all hops have been encoded at least once, the entire path can be
reconstructed successfully, and the probability is
psuccess = (1 − (1 −

r
nmax

)p )n .

(3.3)

For example, set nmax = 9, r = 2, the probability of path reconstruction success in terms
of the number of packets is shown in Figure 3.7 for different values of n. As expected, more
packets are needed to reconstruct longer paths.
On the other hand, we calculate the number of packets when the probability of recover
success is greater than 95%, with different r values, as shown in Figure 3.8. We observe that
less packets are needed if a larger r is chosen. In addition, for paths that have less than 9
hops, 50 packets are sufficient to reconstruct the paths. In most data center networks [10, 17],
a typical short flow contains more than 50 packets, hence the BFPR is feasible for short flows.

3.4

Implementation

In this section, we implement the BFPR in an OpenFlow-enabled network [50].

3.4.1

OpenFlow protocol

OpenFlow is a standard protocol that defines the communication between the control and
forwarding layers of an SDN architecture [50]. In particular, an OpenFlow switch separates
packets forwarding and high level routing decisions, which are moved to a separate controller,
typically a standard server. When the switch receives a packet that it has never encountered
before or doesn’t know how to handle, it forwards this packet to the controller, then the
controller decides how to handle the packet. There are also forwarding rules installed locally
on the switches, called flow entries. Each of them is mainly composed of two parts: a match
field, such as matching those packets from particular host IP address, and an action field,
such as modifying destination host IP address.
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3.4.2

Implementation of the BFPR

We implement the BFPR using CloudLab [18, 51], on which we create an OpenFlow-enabled
network using OpenvSwitch, and the topology is shown in Figure 3.1. In addition, we
utilize POX controller to implement path information encoder, while at the destination we
implement the decoding algorithm.
To encode path information, the IP ID, VLAN ID and IP tos are used as BF , BFS and
len accordingly. We consider that all these fields are initialized to 0 at the source host.
At each hop, the packets are forwarded to the controller, which updates the three fields as
indicated in Algorithm 9 in design section. When packets arrive at the destination host, we
use the the three fields to decode path information according to Algorithm 10 and 11.

3.4.3

Discussion

Due to limited packet header space that can be modified without affecting forwarding actions,
the choices of fields we utilize to implement the BFPR are very limited. However, there have
been studies that suggest more fields that can be modified, such as flow label in IPv6 [26]
and multiple VLAN tags [63]. In [33], the destination MAC address is used as the path
information carrier.
In prototype implementation of the BFPR, we make the tradeoff that the packets have to
be forwarded to the controller at each hop, which might cause transmission delay. However,
if the SDN controller is aware of the network topology, it can send out f low mod packets to
install flow entries on switches. In other words, we can ”translate” the Algorithm 9 into flow
entries. For example, Table 3.2 shows flow entry example installed at S3 in Figure 3.1.In
future work, we try to translate controller application into flow entries efficiently, especially
how to update the BFS .
Table 3.2: Flow entry examples at S3
Match
tos = 1
V lan id = hash(S5 )
V lan id = hash(S6 )

Action
tos = 2
V lan id = hash(S5 , S3 )
V lan id = hash(S6 , S3 )
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3.5

Evaluation

In this section, we conduct evaluation experiments in two aspects: path reconstruction results
validation of the BFPR, and comparisons between the BFPR and other related approaches.

3.5.1

Path reconstruction results validation

Facebook fabric topology. We utilize the topology of Facebook’s newest generation of
data center, fabric, which has been deployed and has served live traffic [24, 23]. Figure 3.9
shows a simple fabric architecture. The basic unit in fabric is a server pod, in which there
are multiple rack switches and 4 fabric switches. On top of server pods, there are 4 spine
planes and in each spine plane, there are multiple spine switches.
One of the major advantages of fabric is that there are many possible equal-length, equalperformance paths between any pair of rack switches in the network. Therefore, tremendous
traffic can be almost evenly distributed among those paths, which results in that fabric is
very resilient to switch failures [24]. Figure 3.9 shows four possible paths between src and
dst servers.
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Figure 3.10: Path reconstruction success
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Figure 3.11: Path reconstruction success
ratio as number of packets increases, small
network, m1 = 20, m2 = 32.

Experiments setup and results. In our evaluation, we test two sizes of fabric network,
a small one and a much larger one, and their parameters are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Parameters of two network sizes
Server pods
Rack switches per server pod
Spine switches per spine plane
Total switches
Intra-pod rack switch pairs
Inter-pod rack switch pairs
Paths between one inter-pod
rack switch pair

Small network
8
5
5
92
80
700

Large network
48
48
48
2688
54144
2598912

20

192

First, we utilize the BFPR to reconstruct paths between all pairs of rack switches,
including four types of paths: paths between intra-pod rack switch pairs that have 3 hops,
paths between inter-pod rack switch pairs that have 5 hops, and two types of detouring
paths between inter-pod rack switch pairs that have 7 and 9 hops. For each pair of rack
switches, one possible path is randomly chosen. Given architecture parameters of the two
networks, we calculate the number of intra-pod and inter-pod rack switch pairs as indicated
in Table 3.3.
For evaluation results, we plot the variation of path reconstruction success ratio (average
value among the same type of paths), which is defined as correct number of hops over total
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Figure 3.12: Path reconstruction success
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number of hops in the path, as the number of packets travel along that path increases.
According to Figure 3.10, as more packets accumulate, the reconstruction success ratio
increases, which is consistent with the BFPR design.
Additionally, we test different parameters of Bloom filter size, which also has impact on
reconstruction success ratio: we set the length of BF and BFS as 16 and 20, and as 20 and
32 for small network. The results are shown in Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11. Comparing
these two figures, the path reconstruction success ratio increases much faster when Bloom
filters are larger, as there are less collisions in Bloom filters, which leads to higher decoding
success ratios. For large network, we set Bloom filter size as 20 and 32, and as 32 and 48,
and we observe similar results in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13.
Second, we reconstruct all possible paths between one pair of inter-pod source and
destination rack switches. For load balance reason, all traffic are desired to be evenly
distributed among all possible paths. We compare the desired traffic distribution and path
reconstruction results, which is the number of packets that actually travel through that path.
More specifically, in small network there are 20 possible paths between one pair of rack
switches. We then generate 2000 packets, and each of them is randomly assigned with one of
the 20 paths. For large network, there are 192 paths and 20000 packets are generated. After
each packet is received, we first put it into a packet group. In this experiment, in addition
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to the original path identifier, (src, len, BF), we add a 8-bit value, which is XOR value of
all switch IDs along the path, since all tested paths have the same src and len.
We conduct the comparison in two situations: after first 10% packets and after all packets
have been received. We plot the ground truth of traffic distribution and reconstruction
results. At the initial stage, since only 10% packets are received, a few paths have been
reconstructed successfully. As shown in Figure 3.14, only a few dots of the two curves, ground
truth and reconstruction results, are matching. For those paths that are not reconstructed
successfully, we can’t obtain how many packets are traveling along them, hence the results
are 0s. After all packets have arrived, all paths have been reconstructed successfully, and we
count how many packets travel along each path. As shown in Figure 3.14, the two curves
are totally matching. The similar results are observed for large network, as in Figure 3.15.

3.5.2

Comparison with other approaches

We first compare the packet header space, i.e., number of bits to encode path information,
of the BFPR with other two approaches: baseline approach and one of the state-of-art
approaches, pathlet tracing [69]. The baseline approach is to simply attach each switch ID
along the path into packet header, which increases linearly as path length increases. On the
other hand, the pathlet tracing [69] utilizes the least packet header space, which increases
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logarithmically as path length increases. However, it requires tremendous amount of flow
entries installed on switches and awareness of topology and routing policies, which neither
the BFPR nor the baseline approach has dependence on. For the BFPR, we utilize 16 bits
and 20 bits when path length equals 3 and 5, 20 bits and 32 bits when path length equals 7
and 9 in small network. In large network, 20 bits and 32 bits are utilized when path length
equals 3 and 5, 32 bits and 48 bits when path length equals 7 and 9. The comparison of
packet header space to encoding path information of these three approaches in small and
large network are shown in Figure 3.16 and Figure 3.17. We observe that for longer paths
and larger network size, the BFPR needs much less packet header space than the baseline
approach, and the difference between the BPPR and pathlet tracing is reducing.
On the other hand, we compare the number of packets that are needed to reconstruct
paths of the BFPR with the approach in [57]. This approach also utilizes multiple packets
to reconstruct paths, but requires 500 to 1000 packets on average when path length is from
1 to 10, hence it can not work on short flows, while the BFPR only needs less than 100
packets when parameters are chosen properly according to Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.13.
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Chapter 4
A Bloom filte based data integrity
check tool: fsum
In high-performance computing (HPC) applications, scientific data can take millions of
million compute hours to yield the dataset.

The results often need to be sanitized,

validated, and archived for long term storage, and/or shared with scientific community for
further analysis. Ensuring its integrity during the usefulness of data life-cycle is paramount
important. This life-cycle may include activities such as copying data from one file system
to other, moving from one site/facility to another. However, it is not uncommon to see user
reporting of missing, and/or corrupted files. Also, silent data corruption has been reported
in many production systems [47].
One of primary approaches that counters file corruption and provide data integrity is
through checksumming [58]. By comparing previous and current checksums, one can detect
whether the content has changed. Conventionally, the checksumming tools are both serial
and file based. This is where the conventional checksum tools fall short as far as extremescale dataset in HPC is concerned. To this end, we present the design, implementation and
evaluation of a Bloom filter based scalable parallel checksumming tool, fsum, for extremescale dataset integrity check. It is built upon the principle of parallel tree walk and work
stealing pattern to maximize parallelism and to overcome the limitation of traditional serial
and file-based checksumming tool. It can generate a single and consistent dataset-level
signature by aggregating chunk-level checksums. More importantly, we came up with a
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novel Bloom filter-based algorithm to reduce memory footprint and to increase scalability.
Note that this chapter is based on my published paper:
Sisi Xiong, Feiyi Wang, and Qing Cao. A Bloom Filter Based Scalable Data Integrity
Check Tool for Large-scale Dataset. 1st Joint International Workshop on Parallel Data
Storage and Data Intensive Scalable Computing Systems, pp. 55-60.

4.1

Problem Formulation

Given a dataset, D = {f0 , f1 , ..., fN −1 }, fi (i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1) are files which are in D, and
there are a total of N files. Our goal is to calculate a single signature, s, which is a assembly
of signatures of individual files. Note that here N is a very large number, and there might
be several large files, for example, their file sizes are beyond 1TiB.

4.2

Design and Implementation

In this section, we discuss three aspects of the design that differentiate fsum from other
solutions. First is about the need for chunk-level checksum versus file-level checksum. Then,
we focus on work-stealing pattern and the consequent need for aggregating (and sorting) all
chunk-level checksum to generate a single, consistent signature. Finally, we show the Bloom
filter-based algorithm as an option to solve the ordering issue discussed earlier. We argue
that it can greatly improve the scalability, at the cost of probabilistic error. And finally, we
discuss the trade-offs on CPU, memory, error probability in details.

4.2.1

File-level and chunk-level checksum

Conventional checksums are file based. However, in HPC environment, it is not uncommon
for end users to create very large files. A recent profiling study using fprof [66] for OLCF
Spider 2 Lustre file system shows a bi-modal distribution: A majority of total number of
files are really small, e.g. less than 1 MiB, and a small percentage of files are really big:
hundred of thousands files with size 4 TiB and beyond, some can be as large as 32 TiB.
With traditional checksumming tools, which are most likely serial and file based, it can take
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many hours to finish processing them. We also ran into cases when a program just hangs with
super large input size. Given this file distribution, breaking up a large file into a sequence
of chunks is absolutely necessary.
Each data chunk object is self-contained, in the sense that it carries all the necessary offset
information for each process to handle them independently even when the chunk has been
transferred from one process to another. Regarding the chunk size, we have to compromise
on two fronts: if we make the chunk small, parallelism increases at the cost of both processing
and metadata overhead associated with each chunk; if we increase the chunk size too much,
we might miss out on the opportunity for increasing parallelism for files with size just below
the chunking threshold. By default, our checksumming approach will parallel scan all files
and adaptively pick a chunk size that represents a balance of total chunks and total file size.

4.2.2

Parallel work-stealing pattern

After chunking, we utilize the work stealing pattern [44, 49] to distribute all the chunks
to multiple processes to generate chunk-level checksums in parallel. In particular, an idle
process sends out a work request, or “steals” work from a busy process, which equally
distributes its local work queue to one or more requesters. We implement the work stealing
pattern using MPI. Initially, the root process (rank 0) puts the files and/or directories that
are intended to be checksummed into its local work queue, while other processes have empty
local work queue. As fsum proceeds, all work gets spread out among multiple processes.
A major characteristic of the work stealing pattern is its randomness. When executing
fsum multiple times, using the same input dataset but different or the same number of
processes, the work distribution among all processes are different, in the sense that a chunk
might be assigned to a different process. Therefore, a process calculates a different set of
chunk-level checksums. However, since we take the same dataset as input, the union of
checksum sets from all the processes are identical.
For example, as shown in Figure 4.1, for a dataset that contains three files, which have
been split into multiple chunks, the work distribution using 4 and 8 process are obviously
different. Furthermore, during two executions of fsum using both 4 processes, the work
distribution are still different. In other words, we need a method that can generate a single
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file A:
p0

file B:
p1
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p2

p3

p4

p5

p6

p7

Work distribution among 8 processes
p0
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p2

p3

Work distribution among 4 processes
p0

p1

p2

p3

Work distribution among 4 processes, another execution

Sorted chunk-level checksums

Figure 4.1: Random work distribution using different/same number of processes during
different executions
and consistent signature regardless the non-deterministic nature of the algorithm and how
user will run it.

4.2.3

Bloom filter based signature generation

We discussed earlier about the unwieldiness of having file-based signatures for a large dataset
with millions of files. Our goal is to generate a single and consistent dataset-level signature
regardless the random nature of work-stealing pattern and how user launch the parallel
process. We compare two design options here: sorting-based and Bloom-filter based.
Design principles and the sorting-based approach
The dataset-level signature should be only dataset content dependent. In other words, two
signatures generated by two executions of fsum based on the same input dataset should
be identical.

However, the randomness of the work stealing pattern leads to the fact
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Algorithm 12 Chunk-level checksums aggregation algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:

procedure Checksum aggregation((C, np))
for each ci in C do
for j = 1 → k do
idx ← hj (ci )
BF (idx) = 1
end for
end for
if rank > 0 then
M P I.send(BF, dst = 0)
else
for i = 1 → np do
BF = BF ∨ M P I.recv(src = i)
end for
end if
M P I.comm.barrier()
if rank == 0 then
sig = SHA1(BF )
return sig
end if
end procedure

. Insert ci to BF

. Send BF to root process
. Gather BFs from all processes

. Generate the signature

that the chunk-level checksums are generated in different processes and in different orders.
Besides, a desirable approach should avoid storing all the chunk-level checksums on a single
process/node, which might face memory pressure and become the bottleneck.
One straightforward solution is to concatenate all chunk-level checksums to a hash list,
and calculate the top hash based on it. Another possible approach is to use a Merkle tree [35]
to generate the root hash. However, as mentioned before, the checksums are generated
in different orders during multiple executions of fsum. Therefore, a sorting is necessary.
However, it is not scalable since the at some point, the root process has to gather checksums
from all the processes and store them in memory as a hash list or a Merkle tree. In extreme
cases, distributed sort or external sort needs to be performed, which inevitably increases the
complexity of the checksum aggregation.
Chunk-level checksums aggregation algorithm
From a different point of view, the Bloom filter can be considered as a bitmap signature of
a set after all elements have been inserted, as long as the Bloom filter parameters are set
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properly. Due to the design and bit array nature of the Bloom filter, we notice it has two
features as a signature of a set:
• The Bloom filter is independent of insertion orders.

For example, the set of

{A, B, C, D, E} and the set of {E, D, C, B, A} lead to the same Bloom filter.
• We can perform OR operation of bit arrays to represent the union of multiple datasets.
For example, if the Bloom filter b1 is calculated based on the set of {A, B, C} and b2 is
based on the set of {D, E}, the result of b1 ∨ b2 represents the set of {A, B, C, D, E},
requiring that b1 and b2 have the same parameters.
Due to these two features, we utilize the Bloom filter as an intermediate data structure
to aggregate the chunk-level checksums. More specifically, first at each process, we insert
all local chunk-level checksums into a Bloom filter, of which all processes has the same
parameters, and then send it to the root process, where we gather all the Bloom filters using
OR operation. Finally we calculate SHA1 hash function based on the final Bloom filter
and we obtain the dataset-level signature. The Bloom filter based dataset-level signature
generation algorithm is shown in Algorithm 14.
Memory and computation overhead
The Bloom filter is highly compact in terms of memory overhead. Since the Bloom filter size
m relates to the error probability, we discuss how to set p and m in Section 4.2.3.
For the computation overhead, the insertion of each element calculates k hash functions,
which takes constant time, hence the overall aggregation process takes O(n) time. On the
other hand, a typical sorting algorithm takes O(n log n), which is less efficient than Bloom
filter based approach when n is at extreme scale.
Error probability
1
1

To focus on errors caused only by the Bloom filter, we assume that the signatures of two different chunks,
or two different Bloom filters, are always different.
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Figure 4.2: Variation of P (e = 0) while m/n increases.
Due to probabilistic nature of the Bloom filter, fsum might end up in error: two different
datasets have the same signature, i.e., the calculated Bloom filter of two different chunk-level
checksum sets are the same.
Consider two sets, C1 = {a0 , a1 , ..., an1 −1 } and C2 = {b0 , b1 , ..., bn2 −1 }, after inserting all
elements in each set into two Bloom filters, B1 and B2 , accordingly, if B1 = B2 , we have the
following two facts:
• Since we calculate the Bloom filter size using the same equation 1.2 and B1 = B2 , n1
is equal to n2 .
• Suppose there are r(r ≥ 1) elements that are in C1 and C2 are different, i.e., C1 =
{x0 , x1 , ..., xr−1 , cr , cr+1 , ..., cn−1 }, C2 = {y0 , y1 , ..., yr−1 , cr , cr+1 , ..., cn−1 } (xi 6= yj (i, j =
0, 1, ..., r − 1)). When performing query operation on B2 using xi , since xi has been
inserted to B1 (no false negative error) and B1 = B2 , we have false positive error, and
the probability is p. Similarly, when performing query operation on B1 using yj , we
also have false positive error with probability of p.
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Conversely, if all xi and yj (i, j = 0, 1, ..., r − 1) have false positive errors, the two Bloom
filters are the same, in which case fsum has lost the ability to detect the signature difference
of these r chunks, which results in an error. Therefore, given r different chunks, the error
probability of fsum is p2r .
We consider the worst case: there is only one different chunk-level checksum, i.e., r = 1.
Since there are a total of n chunks that might be different, the number of errors of fsum
follows a binomial distribution e ∼ B(n, p2 ). Furthermore, we calculate the probability
P (e = 0) = (1 − p2 )n . To make sure P (e = 0) > 99.99%, we set p to
q
√
n
p < 1 − 0.9999.
Since p relates to the ratio

m
n

(4.1)

according to equation 1.1, we set m to

m > −n ×
We plot the variation of P (e = 0) when

ln

p
√
n
1 − 0.9999
.
(ln 2)2

m
n

(4.2)

increases in Figure 4.2, with different values of

n. For example, given 100 million chunks, suppose r = 1 as the worst case, to make sure we
are 99.99% confident that there is no errors from BF-based signature: P (e = 0) > 99.99%,
i.e., (1 − p2 )n > 99.99%, we set p ≤ 0.000001, hence m ≥ −n × ln 0.0000001/(ln 2)2 ≈ 29n,
which is about 2.7GiB memory to store the Bloom filter at each process. While for the
sorting approach, since each chunk-level checksum is a 160-bit SHA1 hash value, all of them
take 14.9GiB memory. If 8 processes are used, at each process, the memory usage is only
1.86GiB. However, in the aggregation of sorting, all checksums have to be stored in the root
process, which becomes the memory bottleneck.

4.3

Experiment Results

In this section, we evaluate the scalability performance of fsum, and compare fsum with
other related approaches.
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4.3.1

16

Evaluation configurations

All the experiments are conducted on Rhea, a 512-node Linux cluster at OLCF. Each Rhea
node has two 8-core 2.0 GHz Intel Xeon processors with 128GB of memory. The underlying
file system is Spider 2 Lustre file system. Due to page limits, we don’t consider any effect of
stripe count, which is set to the default value 4 in all experiments.
We choose two datasets that scientific users created on Spider 2, D1 and D2 , and their
parameters are shown in Table 4.1. They are representative in the sense that, in D1 , there
are more than 28 millions files, and 93% of them are less than 4KiB, while the average file
size in D2 is 1.19GiB and the largest file is 514.41GiB.
Table 4.1: Parameters of two datasets
Total size
Number of files
Average file size
Chunk size
Number of chunks

D1
D2
5.39TiB
14.74TiB
28,114,281
15,590
205.83KiB 1.19GiB
16MiB
64MiB
28,343,725 251,629
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4.3.2

Evaluation results

First, we evaluate the scalability performance of fsum, using 8 Rhea nodes with different
number of process to generate signatures of the two datasets, and we plot the runtime
and processing rate in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4. As expected, there are speedups when
using more processes. We notice that the speedup increases almost linearly as the number
of processes increases, until the performance is bounded by I/O bandwidth. In addition,
comparing results of the two datasets, we observe that generating signature for D1 is much
less efficient than for D2 , since handling small files is bounded by metadata retrieval in Lustre
file systems.
The signatures generated using different number of processes for the same dataset are
always the same, which verifies that the signature generated by fsum is only dataset content
dependent, hence the Bloom filter based dataset-level signature generation approach is
feasible and correct.
Next, we conduct experiments to validate that fsum can detect data corruption.
Specifically, we compare the signatures of the original dataset and the one that has been
corrupted. For each dataset, we conduct 100 experiments, in each of which we randomly
choose a file and change a single byte at a random position. We notice that the signatures of
the corrupted datasets are always different from the one of the original dataset. Therefore,
fsum can detect data corruption and can be a tool for data integrity check.
Finally, we compare fsum with related approaches in terms of of memory usage and time
efficiency. First, we compare the memory usage of the Bloom filter in fsum and the maximum
usage of sorting at the root process, as shown in Figure 4.5. For Bloom filter parameters,
we set P (e = 0) > 99.99%, and m is calculated according to equation 4.2. We observe that
the Bloom filter approach uses about 5.8 and 7.1 times less memory than the sorting for D1
and D2 accordingly.
Second, we compare the runtime of sha1sum and fsum on a single node, using a 514.41TiB
file. For fsum, we utilize 4 processes with different chunk sizes, and the results are shown
in Figure 4.6. We notice that fsum is around 2.6 to 4.4 times more efficient than the
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Figure 4.5: Memory comparison of the
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single-threaded sha1sum. Furthermore, for large files, a larger chunksize results in better
performance.
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Chapter 5
A Bloom filter based data corruption
detection tool
In this chapter, we aim to detect which files are corrupted, i.e., data corruption, if there
is a dataset-level signature mismatch, according to the result of Chapter 4. A straight
forward solution is an in-memory key-value store, where we store the chunk name (key)
and corresponding signature (value) pair in the key-value store. When detecting whether
there are data corruption, we compute the new chunk signature, query the key-value store
and obtain the previous one, and compare the two to check if they are matching. Since we
use SHA1 to calculate chunk-level signature and there is no way to predict how the data
will be corrupted, we consider that the signature is essentially a 160-bit random string. In
other words, the number of possible signatures is infinite. Therefore, key-value Bloom filter
(kBF) is not the right choice, since we can not generate infinite number of encodings, due
to that there must be a one-to-one mapping between a value and an encoding in order to
return the correct value. As a result, we develop the checksumming Bloom filter (cBF) for
data corruption purpose.Therefore, we propose a compact data structure to store checksums,
called cBF (checksumming Bloom filter), which is an extension based on classic Bloom filter
and the kBF (key-value Bloom filter) [67]. Through cBF, if there is a dataset-level signature
mismatch according the result of fsum, we further determine which files are corrupted.
Therefore, we can recover data through redundant copies or RAID parity mechanism. In
addition, we analyze the error probability of identifying data corruption of the cBF.
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5.1

Problem Formulation

The objectives we consider are datasets stored on clustered file systems. Within these
datasets, there are files and sub-datasets. We make no assumptions about directory structure
of the datasets. To detect data corruption through checksumming, there are two major
components: first, we calculate a signature for each file chunk, and store them in a signature
file. Second, we compute signatures of all the file chunks in the dataset which is tended for
integrity check, query the signature file, and compare newly computed ones to previously
stored ones, and report those files with different signatures. The straightforward approach is
to utilize key-value store, while file chunk names are keys, and corresponding signatures are
values. However, we encounter a dilemma between storage scalability and time efficiency:
if an in-memory key-value store is used, we might face memory pressure when the number
of files reaches millions, even billions. If an on-disk key-value store is used, time efficiency
is suffered in both insert and query operations. Therefore, we aim to find a sweet point
between storage capacity and time efficiency.

5.2

Design and Implementation

In this section, we present the design of data corruption detection based on parallel
checksumming.

5.2.1

Design Overview

Figure shows the design flow of our data corruption detector. If a dataset is taken as input
for an application program, or users want to check whether there is data corruption or not,
we first compute signatures based on current dataset, and compare the newly computed ones
with previously stored ones. We report either there is no data corruption, or names of those
corrupted files.
In last chapter, we already discussed how to compute chunk-level signatures, through file
chunking technique and work stealing pattern, using multiple process to achieve high time
efficiency.
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Figure 5.1: Design overview of data corruption detector
After computing signatures, we need to store them for further signature comparison.
One straightforward solution is in-memory key-value store, where keys are file names, and
values are corresponding signatures. However, memory might become the bottleneck given
such large number of key-value pairs. To achieve high memory efficiency, one observation
is that we do not need to store file names or signatures explicitly. For file names, we can
obtain them when we compute the new signatures. For previous signatures, our goal is to
detect difference rather than knowing the exact value. Therefore, we develop an in-memory
key-value store that extends classical Bloom filers to store file name and signature pairs,
which is called checksumming Bloom filter (cBF) and is discussed in Section 5.2.2.
Finally, to detect data corruption, we conduct query operation on designed cBF, and
determine whether newly computed signatures are consistent with previous stored ones,
which is discussed in Section 5.2.3.

5.2.2

Store Signatures using cBF

As mentioned in design overview, instead of storing file chunk name and signature pairs in
a in-memory key-value store explicitly, we develop the checksumming Bloom filter (cBF) to
store them. The cBF has similar structure as Bloom filter, however, in each cell of cBF,
different from a single bit in a Bloom filter, there are a counter and a value. The counter
records how many elements (in our case, the chunk name and signature pair) have been
hashed to this cell. The value is a small Bloom filter, denoted as d, where signatures are
inserted. The notation and parameters of cBF are shown in Table 5.1. Essentially, cBF is a
two-dimensional Bloom filter, where the first dimensional Bloom filter stores file chunk name
information (keys), the second dimensional d keeps record of signature information (values).
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Algorithm 13 cBF Insert Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:

procedure Insertion(c, s)
for i = 1 → k1 do
idx1 = hi (c)
cBF [idx1 ].counter = cBF [idx1 ].counter + 1
for j = 1 → k2 do
idx2 = hj (s)
cBF [idx1 ].value[idx2 ] = 1
end for
end for
end procedure

. Insert (c, s) to cBF

At each process, after calculating a chunk-level signature, we insert the chunk name and
signature pair to a local cBF, according to Algorithm 13. Specifically, we first calculate k1
hashed cells out of m1 positions in cBF, based on chunk name. At each cell, we insert the
signature into d, the second dimensional Bloom filter, which has m2 bits in size and k2 hash
functions.
After all local cBFs have been constructed, every process except the root process sends
its local cBF to the root process (MPI.rank = 0). While at the root process, we aggregate all
cBFs and generate a global cBF, according to Algorithm 14. In particular, Due to bit nature
of cBF, and all local cBFs have the same parameters, at each cell, we add all counters, and
for values, we use OR operation to aggregate all second dimensional Bloom filters d.
Table 5.1: Parameters of cBF
Notation
Parameter
n1
Number of file chunks
m1
Size of cBF
k1
Number of hash function of cBF
p1
preset false positive probability of cBF
m2
Size of BF
k2
Number of hash function of BF
p2
preset false positive probability of d
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Algorithm 14 cBF Aggregation Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:

procedure Aggregation(cBF1 , cBF2 , ..., cBFp )
if rank > 0 then
M P I.send(cBF, dst = 0)
else
for i = 1 → np do
cBFi = M P I.rcv(src = i)
for j = 1 → m1 do
cBF [j].counter + = cBFi [j].counter
cBF [j].value ∨ = cBFi [j].value
end for
end for
end if
M P I.comm.barrier()
if rank == 0 then
sig = SHA1(cBF )
end if
end procedure

5.2.3

. Send cBF to root process
. Gather cBFs from all processes

. Generate the signature

Compare Signatures using cBF

To detect data corruption, we utilize cBF to report files of which the newly computed
signature is different with the one stored in cBF. We first compute a new signature for each
file chunk. Next, instead of constructing a cBF through insert operation, we perform query
operation on the previously generated cBF, according to Algorithm 15.
Specifically, given a chunk name and signature pair (ci , si 0), we calculate k1 hash functions,
and utilized all values, i.e., di , i = {1, 2, ..., k1 }, from these hashed cells. We obtain an
aggregated Bloom filter, D, which is AND operation result of all ds. Next, we query D using
si 0. If si 0 is in D, we consider that s = s0, hence there is no data corruption. Otherwise, we
report the file as corrupted.

5.3

Analysis

Due to false positive errors of Bloom filters, the cBF might yield an error, which is defined
as following:
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Algorithm 15 cBF Query Algorithm
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:

procedure Query(c, s0)
Initialize D
for i = 1 → k1 do
idx1 = hi (c)
D = D ∧ cBF [idx1 ].value
end for
return query(D, s0)
end procedure
Suppose there is a file chunk c, of which previous and newly computed signature are s

and s0, accordingly. The ground truth is that c is corrupted due to various reasons, i.e.,
s 6= s0. However, the cBF returns that the key-value pair (c, s0) has been inserted before.
In such a scenario, the cBF indicates that s = s0, hence it fails to detect that c has been
corrupted, which results in an error.
Table 5.2: Notations
Notation
Meaning
ci
Number of (c, s) pairs inserted to di
di
i th Bloom filter
D
AND results of all di
ci 0
Number of (c, s) pairs inserted to di 0, ci 0 = ci − 1
di 0
i th modified Bloom filter
0
D
AND results of all di 0
d0
Bloom filter where only s is inserted
Since the error probability is related to parameters of cBF, we need to set parameters
properly to ensure certain probability of data corruption detection success. In other words,
given a set of cBF parameters, we need to predict the error probability. In the following, the
notations we use are shown in Table 5.2. We consider k1 cells that c has been hashed into,
which contain k1 counters and k1 Bloom filters, di , i = {1, 2, ..., k1 }. For the i th cell, suppose
the counter is ci , which indicates that ci (chunkname, signature) pair have been inserted to
di . According to Section 5.2.3, an error indicates that a false positive error happens when
querying AND result of all di , i.e., D, using s0. Therefore, the error probability of cBF is the
false positive probability of D.
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For D, a false positive error occurs when there are k2 bits in D are set to 1. We calculate
the false positive probability, pe , according to
pe = p(D(j) = 1)k2 ,

(5.1)

where p(D(j) = 1) is the probability of j th bit in D is set to 1, j = {1, 2, ..., m2 }.
Next, we analyze p(D(j) = 1). Due to bit array nature of Bloom filters, we can represent
the union of two sets by using OR operation of two Bloom filters. Therefore, for each di , we
have

di = d0 ∨ di 0,
where in d0 , we insert the (c, s) pair, and in di 0, we insert all other (chunkname, signature)
pairs except (c, s). Note that the k-v pairs inserted to all di 0 are independent, hence we can
analyze ci 0 using the analysis results in [67].
As a result, we can represent D as following
D = d1 ∧ d2 ∧ ... ∧ dk1
= (d0 ∨ d1 0) ∧ (d0 ∨ d2 0) ∧ ... ∧ (d0 ∨ dk1 0)
= (d1 0 ∧ d2 0 ∧ ... ∧ dk1 0) ∨ d0
= D 0 ∨ d0
Therefore, when considering the probability of a bit is set to 1 in D, we investigate the
one in D0 and in d0 separately, and we have

p(D(j) = 1) = p(D0(j) = 1) + p(d0 (j) = 1).

(5.2)

We first analyze p(D0(j) = 1). After inserting a signature (a random one except s) into
di 0, the probability of a bit is not set to 1 by a hash function is

1−

1
.
m2
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Since there are k2 hash functions, the probability of the bit is not set to 1 by none of the
k2 hash functions is

k2
1
1−
.
m2
After inserting ci 0 signatures, the probability of the bit is still 0 is


1
1−
m2

k2 ci 0
.

Therefore, the probability of the bit is set to 1 is

k2 ci 0
1
.
1− 1−
m2
Since there are k1 modified Bloom filters, di 0, and we use AND operation to obtain D0,
the probability of a bit is set to 1 in D0 is
0

p(D0(j) = 1) =

ck 1
Y
r=c1

0


k2 r !
1
1− 1−
m2

(5.3)

Next, we analyze the probability of the jth bit is set to 1 in d0 , i.e., p(d0 (j) = 1). Since
s is the only element that has been inserted to d0 , the probability of a bit is set to 1 is


1
p(d0 (j) = 1) = 1 − 1 −
m2

k2
(5.4)

According to Equation 5.1, 5.2 5.3 5.4 , the probability of a bit is set to 1 in D is
p(D(j) = 1) = p(D0(j) = 1) + p(d0 (j) = 1)
0
ck1
k2 r !

k2

Y
1
1
=
+1− 1−
1− 1−
m
m2
2
0
r=c1

In conclue, according to Equations 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, the error probabililty of cBF is
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pe = (p(D0(j) = 1) + p(d0 (j) = 1))k2
 0
k2
!
ck1




k
r
k
2
2
Y
1
1

1− 1−
=
+1− 1−
m
m
2
2
0

(5.5)

r=c1

Note that in Equation 5.5, the value of ci 0 follow the distribution discussed in [67]. If
there is at least on ci 0 is equal to 0, p(D0(j) = 1) = 0, and the probability is
pa = 1 − (1 − p(ci 0 = 0))k1 .
We calculate the error probability of this case is

pe a =


k2 !k2
1
1− 1−
.
m2

For all other cases, the probability is

pb = 1 − pa .
For estimation, suppose there are 2 (chunkname, signature) pairs inserted to D, the
false positive error probability is

pe b =


2k2 !k2
1
1− 1−
.
m2

Therefore, the overall error probability is

pe = pa × pea + pb × peb .

(5.6)

Since m1 and m2 can be calculated according to Equation 1.2, and preset false positive
probability, p1 and p2 . Suppose n1 = 1, 000, 000, n2 = 2. We plot the error probability,
according to Equation 5.6, when changing p1 and p2 according in Figure 5.2 and in Figure 5.3.
We observe that decrease p2 has much larger impact on decreasing error probability than
decreasing p2 . Additionally, we plot the error probability when changing p1 and p2 at the
same time in Figure 5.4, we obtain similar results.
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Experiment Results

In this section, we evaluate the designed CBF based data corruption detection approach,
using both synthetic data and scientific dataset created on Spider 2.

5.4.1

Parameter tuning and error rates

Due to probabilistic nature of Bloom filters, the parameters of CBF should be set properly
to ensure the success of detect all data corruption. Specifically, we consider the preset false
positive error probability of first and second dimension Bloom filers in CBF, p1 and p2 . On
the other hand, we also consider the impact causing by amount of corrupted data, in terms
of number of corrupted files. Regarding the dataset, we generate 1 million files, each of
which is 4KiB and all of them are located in a single directory. We corrupt 1, 10, 100,
and 1000 files in four separate experiments. For each corrupted file, we change one byte
data at a random position. For each experiment, we run 10 times to get the maximum,
minimum and average results, which are the number of detected corrupted files, and are
shown in Figure 5.5, Figure 5.6, Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8, accordingly. As we observe, the
error rates in theoretical analysis result shown in Figure 5.4, and in the experimental results
are matching. On the other hand, cBF based approach can detect all the corrupted files
successfully with very low error rates (10˙-5), as long as the parameters are set properly.
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5.4.2

Testing using scientific datasets

Since we aim to develop a parallel checksumming tool, we test the horizontal scalability
performance of the designed CBF. We use a dataset which is created by users on Spider 2.
The dataset contains 1,716 files, of which the total size is 9.69TiB, with an average file size
5.78GiB. We test the horizontal scalability of the designed data corruption tool. We set the
false positvie probability, p1 = p2 , and tested two values, 0.1 and 0.01. After storing all
chunk-level signatures in a signature file, we use different number of processes to run the
query operation. The runtime is shown in Figure 5.9. We observe that CBF achieves almost
linear speedups when the number of processes increase.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
By using the classic Bloom filter as a base design, we extend it into a approximate keyvalue storage scheme called the kBF. We present a comprehensive investigation on the
algorithm design of the kBF, analyze its performance in storing large datasets, and evaluate
its performance in both synthetic workloads and a real application study. According to our
experiment results, the kBF is highly compact, and supports insertion, query, update and
deletion operations with adjustable error ratios. Compared to deterministic schemes, the
kBF is more suitable to be implemented in devices with limited memory space and timing
constraints, as long as approximate results are tolerated by application semantics.
We present the Bloom filter based packet path reconstruction approach (BFPR), by
encoding path information in two Bloom filters that are encapsulated into packet header.
By interpreting the path as a set of key-value pairs, where the keys are the switch IDs and
the values are orders of switches along the path, we transform the path reconstruction to a
variant of key-value store problem: encoding key-value pairs while packets are transmitted
in the network, and decoding the key-value pairs to reconstruct the path at the destination
host. Through evaluation on Facebook data center topology, the BFPR reconstructs the
paths successfully. Comparing with other related approaches, the BFPR is independent
with network topology and routing policies, and works properly for multiple possible paths
between one pair of hosts and for short flows.
We present the design, implementation and evaluation of a Bloom filter based scalable
parallel checksumming tool, fsum, for extreme-scale dataset integrity check. It is built
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upon the principle of parallel tree walk and work stealing pattern to maximize parallelism
and to overcome the limitation of traditional serial and file-based checksumming tool. It
can generate a single and consistent dataset-level signature by aggregating chunk-level
checksums, which addressed the unwieldiness of generating and maintaining large number
file-based signatures, particularly when the number of files keep growing in large scientific
dataset. More importantly, we came up with a novel Bloom filter-based algorithm to reduce
memory footprint and to increase scalability. Using representative and real production
datasets, we demonstrated that fsum exhibits near-linear scalability, and is able to detect
data corruption while it’s both memory and computation efficient than others approaches.
We propose a compact data structure to store checksums, called cBF (checksumming
Bloom filter), which is an extension based on classic Bloom filter and the kBF (key-value
Bloom filter) [67]. Through cBF, if there is a dataset-level signature mismatch according the
result of fsum, we can determine which files are corrupted and detect if there are lost files.
Therefore, we can recover data through redundant copies or RAID parity mechanism. In
addition, we analyze its probability of identifying data corruption. To this end, we present
how to set parameters of cBF to achieve certain probability of identification success.
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